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My sister had a baby. We would have company
over and she’d be there with her breast out,
feeding him ... cereal or whatever.
The other day she took me aside and said
’Emo, can you baby-sit little Derek while I go to
the carnival ... and look for the father?’
I said, OK. So I’ m pushing him through
the park, and he’s crying ... because I forgot the
stroller.
I take him home and I’m trying to rinse out
his diaper in the toilet [...] ... I accidentally let go
of his foot. (Emo Philips, cited in Goatley, 2012)
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In garden path jokes (GP jokes), an initially dominant semantic representation of an
ambiguous text is violated. It needs to be revised in order to re-establish a coherent
representation. The processing of GP jokes is modeled on a theoretical level as a dy-
namic interaction between a stimulus and a recipient. Both sides of the interaction
are influenced by a wide range of factors that together determine the comprehension
process. The focus is put on three aspects: (i) the salience of the first interpretation,
(ii) the accessibility of the hidden interpretation, and (iii) the humorous potential of the
whole joke. The comprehension process is assumed as probabilistic, non-monotonic, and
incremental reasoning towards the most plausible interpretation of both linguistic and
non-linguistic input. Basic assumptions about the sequential nature of the processing
– detection of incoherence, revision of the semantic representation, and emotional reac-
tion (mirth) – are empirically investigated in a first series of experiments. 48 GP jokes
were manipulated and presented to participants in three conditions: (i) with coherent
ending, (ii) with joke ending, or (iii) with discourse-incoherent ending. A rating study
(N=69), a reading times study (N =24), and three studies with recordings of ERP and
pupil changes (N = 21, 24, and 24) supported the hypothesized cognitive processes.
Jokes were rated as more funny, moderately unpredictable, and comprehensible. They
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showed increased reading times of the final word compared to coherent endings. ERP
data mainly revealed semantic integration di culties (N400). Some weak and mixed
evidence is presented for an enhanced late frontal positivity (fP600), possibly related
to the emotional outcome, and for a late left anterior negativity (LLAN), possibly re-
lated to increased processing e↵ort. The emotional reaction to GP jokes is supported
by larger pupil dilations in response to joke endings. Incoherent endings were rated as
less funny, less predictable, and incomprehensible. They also showed increased read-
ing times. The N400 was stronger and sustained. Incoherent endings also showed a
context-sensitive P600 e↵ect. An additional self-paced reading time experiment high-
lighted the influence of contextual constraint on the interpretation and re-interpretation
processes by semantic priming prior to the GP joke. These findings support the theo-
retical conceptualization of salience and accessibility. Taken together, the processing of
GP jokes is presented as playful communication that allows the strengthening of impor-
tant cognitive skills related to the adaptation to changing environments. Mirth as the
emotional reaction accompanying the cognitive processing is discussed as a reward for
the engagement in this behavior.
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A comedian enters the stage and announces to the audience: “I want to die peacefully
in my sleep like my grandfather. Not screaming in terror like his passengers.”1 This
grandfather joke exploits a mechanism that is a ubiquitous strategy of verbal humor.
In this dissertation, this fairly homogenous subclass of verbal humor will be referred
to as a garden path (GP) joke. One does not need to be a comedian to know this
specific moment between the delivery of a joke and the mirthful reaction that hopefully
follows it. There is a confused look in the faces that instantly changes to smile and
laughter, once the joke is successfully comprehended. But what exactly is happening
in the recipient’s mind in this very moment between confusion and laughter? Theo-
retical considerations about the essential aspects of humor have a long tradition in the
history of philosophy, aesthetics, literature, and even psychoanalytical psychology (see
for a historical overview Martin, 2007, p.20↵.). The interest of empirical and cognitive
psychology in the subject, however, still remains scarce. Investigating the underlying
neuro-cognitive and emotional processes of this very moment can reveal important in-
sights for at least two overlapping research fields: psychology of humor (Martin, 2007)
and discourse comprehension (e.g., Kintsch, 1998).
1Attributed to Bob Monkhouse, retrieved from http://www.bitcomedy.co.uk/comedy-features/
101-short-jokes/ on the 4th of June, 2013.
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The processing of verbal humor – in particular of GP jokes – can only be fully understood
within the context of these two research fields. On the one hand, it is necessary to set
out a framework of humor, specifically its comprehension by the human mind. On the
other hand it deeply touches questions investigated in the field of text and discourse
comprehension. Both research fields will be depicted in more detail in Chapter 2, but
some important aspects will be described in advance here in the general introduction.
1.2 A Neuro-Cognitive Approach to Humor
The Oxford English Dictionary defines humor as:
that quality of action, speech, or writing which excites amusement; oddity,
jocularity, facetiousness, comicality, fun. [...] the faculty of perceiving what
is ludicrous or amusing, or of expressing it in speech, writing, or other com-
position; jocose imagination or treatment of a subject. (Simpson, Weiner,
et al., 1989, p.468)
This definition (cited in Martin, 2007) presents three core aspects of humor: (i) a qual-
ity to be perceived as amusing, (ii) mental operations, and (iii) an emotional reaction
(amusement, exhilaration, or mirth). Humor is associated with amusement. Amuse-
ment, on the contrary, is usually associated with humor. When trying to understand
humor from a scientific point of view it is necessary to disentangle and clarify two im-
portant aspects related to humor. First, it is important to understand that humor,
respectively the mental operations associated with humor, and laughter, respectively
the emotional state of mirth, are overlapping and dynamically interacting, yet distinct
phenomena. Humor can be present without the presence of laughter, just as laughter
can be present without humor (see Gervais & Wilson, 2005).
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Talking about the processing of verbal humor, one has to bear in mind that there
are an emotional aspect and a cognitive aspect to be considered. These two aspects
can be attributed to two distinguishable neural pathways. Processes related to the
cognitive aspect mainly involve cortical and subcortical structures. Processes related to
the emotional aspect mainly involve the mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic reward system
and the amygdala (see for an overview Vrticka, Black, & Reiss, 2013). As for the
emotional aspect, it is further important to distinguish two kinds of laughter which
are also based on dissociated neurological circuits, the so-called Duchenne-laughter vs.
the non-Duchenne-laughter. Only the first one is laughter that is the expression of
the emotional state called amusement, exhilaration or mirth. It is characterized by
the crow-feet around the eyes, the muscular activation of the orbicularis oculi (see
for a detailed description of the emotional state in Ruch, 1993). Gervais and Wilson
(2005) have convincingly argued that the emotional state associated with Duchenne-
laughter evolutionarily originated in the context of play. Laughter communicates that
an individual currently is placed in a safe environment. This emotional state is portrayed
as highly contagious and associated with a wide range of evolutionary advantages on
both the individual and group level.
In line with this idea, Fredrickson (1998) described positive emotions – as for example
amusement, i.e. mirth – to be radically distinct from negative emotions. According to
her“broaden-and-build”theory, positive emotions serve to broaden the scope of attention
whereas negative emotions narrow down our perception in order to perform specific ac-
tions that guarantee survival; such as the fight or flight instinct in reaction to rage or fear
triggering situations. This means that positive emotions are associated with a di↵erent
cognitive style. This cognitive style is characterized by a stronger dissociation of goal-
oriented behavior (Apter, 1989). Adapting a playful state of mind enables to build up
specific social, physical or cognitive skills that enrich the individual’s resources. This hy-
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pothesis about the positive emotions was empirically quite well supported (Fredrickson
& Branigan, 2005). Participants whose a↵ective state was changed by watching positive
films (amusement or contentment) were more likely to apply a global span of attention
in a visual processing task compared to participants who watched films with neutral
or negative emotional content. The relationship between cognitive style and emotional
state/mood can be found in a wide range of cognitive tasks (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007),
and is also very well corroborated by neuro-cognitive findings about the relationship
between positive emotions, dopamine level, the activation of the mesolimbic reward sys-
tem, and cognitive flexibility, such as creativity or problem solving (Ashby, Isen, et al.,
1999; Ashby, Velentin, & Turken, 2002). Positive emotions, therefore, seem to trigger a
cognitive style that allows people to think outside the box, to recognize unexpected so-
lutions or original relationships and associations. This in turn activates the mesolimbic
reward center and increases the dopamine level in the brain, which additionally induces
a positive mood. It makes sense to see this cyclic process as a specific mode of playful
behavior to train and build personal resources which can only take place in safe (i.e.
“non-threatening”) environments (Gervais & Wilson, 2005).
As for the cognitive aspect, it is important to understand the ontological status of humor
(see for a detailed account on this question Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2011, p.16). Is
humor a real existing feature of the environment or is it a construction of the human
mind? Unlike color, weight, or length, humor is not an inherent and intrinsic feature of
certain stimuli in the environment. As a consequence, there is no objective measure of
humor. Di↵erent individuals will end up with di↵erent judgements about the amusement
of a specific situation, event, object, or joke. Nevertheless, there usually exists a huge
overlap in the judgements about what people would consider as funny or amusing. This
is especially true for people who share a common cultural or sociological background.
But some stimuli also seem to be quite universally considered as humorous. Humor
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might best be understood as a latent potential that could express itself as humorous
experience with the help of an individual’s perceptual e↵ort. Consequently, humor has
to be considered as an interactional phenomenon between stimuli in the environment
and an interpreting mind.
The question then arises as to which features a stimulus has to show in order to carry
this latent humorous potential and to be (reliably) perceived as humorous by individu-
als. The most dominant answer within a framework of cognitive sciences can be traced
back to ideas by Kant and Schopenhauer, and deals with di↵erent variations of the
concept of “incongruity” (Forabosco, 1992; Giora, 1991; McGhee, 1979; Nerhardt, 1977;
Suls, 1972).2 One basic assumption unifies the di↵erent theoretical proposals related
to the concept of incongruity: Incongruity is proposed to arise due to a contradiction
or violation between a mental prototypical representation of a stimulus or situation –
including its associated expectations – and its actual emerging appearance. The phys-
ically most vivid realization of this idea was carried out in an experiment by Nerhardt
(1977). Participants were confronted with di↵erent weights that they had to lift. A
series of weights served as the learning phase. By lifting one after the other participants
started building up expectations about the range of weight these external stimuli main-
tain (mental prototypical representation). After this learning phase participants then
lifted a weight that was much lighter or much heavier than the range of weight they
had encoded as prototypical representations in the learning phase. The di↵erence in
weights accordingly could serve as a physical measure of incongruity. As hypothesized,
participants who were confronted with a high incongruity, spontaneously reacted with
laughter.
On a more abstract notion, Koestler (1964) defined incongruity as the “bisociation” of
two incompatible ideas. As for the comprehension of metaphor or like any other cre-
2Other important families of theories of humor have been suggested in the literature but are not
as relevant for this dissertation project. (see Martin, 2007)
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ative act of the human mind, humor is related to the mental ability of simultaneously
maintaining and integrating two incompatible interpretations of a stimulus. Similar
to the weight-experiment, this incompatibility is additionally accompanied by a strong
contrast between these two ideas. These considerations have been continued and elabo-
rated within the framework of“mental spaces”(Fauconnier, 1994), “conceptual blending”
(Fauconnier & Turner, 2008) and “semantic leaps” (Coulson, 2001). According to these
approaches, humorous stimuli o↵er the possibility that semantic concepts that are orig-
inally unrelated to each other can be blended with each other. These new, unusual,
and creative combinations of memorized chunks of knowledge from di↵erent domains
are assumed to be at the core of a humorous experience.
Incongruity theories of humor have been criticized as being mere descriptive explanations
of the features of a potentially humorous stimulus. They do not o↵er full theoretical
explanations of why incongruity is perceived as funny (see Hurley et al., 2011, p.45↵.).
A theory with higher explanational power that intends to connect the concepts of in-
congruity theories with its neuro-cognitive underpinnings and evolution-theoretically
embedded conjectures was recently presented by Hurley et al. (2011). Their theory is
based on the assumption that individuals on the one hand need to have stable and
reliable beliefs and “theories” about their environment. These beliefs are usually un-
questioned in order to allow individuals to function quickly and e ciently. On the other
hand, individuals need to be able to adapt quickly and e ciently to new and unex-
pected changes in the environment. Accordingly, in a nutshell, these authors assume
that humor has developed as an emotional reward for individuals in order to constantly
question and overcome committed false beliefs before they enter the long-term mem-
ory as crystallized knowledge. Certain situations and stimuli lead individuals to an
automatic and covertly entered false belief. Consequently, individuals then rely and
act upon this false committed belief. Since such a behavior in the long-term means
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an evolutionary disadvantage, the detection and debugging3 of the cognitive represen-
tations of the environment is crucial. These debugging processes are highly costly and
demanding for the cognitive system. The emotional benefits of a humorous reaction ac-
cordingly motivate an individual to carry out these adjustment processes to surprising
new input. This “belief revision” concept is compatible with both outlined realizations
of incongruity theories. On the one hand, it is able to explain on a more in-depth level
why the detection of incongruity and its resolution by finding an alternative rule that
accounts for the violation lead to the experience of humor. Incongruity-detection and
-resolution are based on the debugging of a false committed belief regarding the current
situation or environment. On the other hand, this approach is able to cover the concept
of “bisociation” (Koestler, 1964), since the switching between two (or more) alternative
interpretations of a specific stimulus taps into the same evolutionarily advantageous
mechanism of quick adaptation and model-building of representations of an individual’s
environment. Last but not least, this theory is compatible with the outlined emotional
aspect to humor. The advantage of a quickly adapting cognitive belief system can be
considered as one – possibly the most important one – of the intellectual benefits that
individuals gain from the playful behavior in a safe and non-threatening environment,
as described above.
Summarizing the outlined concepts about the nature of humor, it is possible to portray
at least one class of stimuli that carry certain features which are reliably perceived
as humorous. They involve an incongruity-inducing mechanism, which as described
is either related to the revision of a committed false belief during an interpretation
process or to the simultaneous representation or alternating realization of at least two
incompatible and contrasting conceptualizations of objects or situations (see Mayerhofer,
2013).




In popular culture, the following riddle (discussed in Carreiras, 1996; A. Sanford, 1986)
became well known as the “surgeon riddle”. It was subsequently taught to numerous
students in the field of gender studies and related disciplines.
A young boy and his father are in a car accident. The father dies at the scene.
The boy is transported to the hospital, taken immediately into surgery. But
the surgeon steps out of the operating room and says, “I can’t operate on
this boy he is my son!” (unknown origin)
At least in earlier days, this text was accompanied by severe comprehension impedance.
Many readers were incapable – or at least found it highly di cult – to retract the
dominant interpretation that the surgeon was male and to substitute it with the al-
ternative interpretation that the surgeon was female; i.e. the mother of the son. The
example illustrates the importance of automatic imports of background knowledge dur-
ing the comprehension of a discourse/text. Therefore, it served to deconstruct gender
stereotypical knowledge in society. On a less sociological level, the surgeon riddle is an
excellent example of the default interpretation processes necessary for a reader’s com-
prehension of a chunk of words and sentences in order to build up a coherent mental
representation of what the sender of the text planned to communicate.
Research on discourse comprehension focuses on the interplay between the linguistic
input (letters, words, sentences, syntax, etc.), and how this input is incorporated by
readers in order to build a cognitive representation of this input. It is generally agreed
that the construction of this mental representation of a discourse is based on a complex
integration of syntactical, lexical-semantic and referential properties of the linguistic in-
put in combination with background knowledge and pragmatic aspects that take place
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in the social interaction between the sender and the recipient of a message (e.g, Graesser,
Millis, & Zwaan, 1997; Kintsch, 1988; A. J. Sanford & Garrod, 1998; Zwaan & Rad-
vansky, 1998; Zwaan & Rapp, 2006). However, language is only an approximative
medium. Individual di↵erences, vague denotations, ample room for fine-grained di↵er-
ences, diverse linguistic and non-linguistic backgrounds, and especially the impossibility
of communicating every single detail of the message give space to much ambiguity as
an inherent feature of language and communication.
Typically, the most basic goal of communication is the maximization of the overlap
between the intended meaning of the message on the sender’s part and the cognitive
representation of the message on the recipient’s part. Given that this maximization
of the overlap between sender and recipient is the goal of a discourse, all participants
of the discourse commonly put an e↵ort into achieving this goal. This e↵ort has been
coined the “cooperative principle” of communication (Grice, 1975). According to this
principle, both sender and recipient aim to reduce the ambiguity of the discourse. Com-
munication, however, can additionally serve many other purposes. Most importantly
in the current context, language is a suitable device for the purpose of a humorous ex-
perience. The sender of verbal humor often intentionally exploits pragmatic principles
of communication. This type of communication has been referred to as “non-bona-fide”
communication compared to“bona-fide”communication (Raskin & Attardo, 1994). The
humorous purpose of communication can be combined with any other functional aspect
of communication. Humorous experience and social bonding are associated in certain
types of teasing and playful-cooperative communication (e.g., Boxer & Cortés-Conde,
1997; Kottho↵, 2006, 2009; Norrick, 2009). Humorous experience and critical decon-
struction or the display of superiority and even hostility are usually combined in satirical
or sarcastic usage of language (cf. the mechanism of irony as portrayed in Mayerhofer,
2013).
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1.4 Garden Path Jokes
A huge subclass of verbal humor, here referred to as garden path (GP) jokes (Dynel,
2009, 2012), directly illustrates the outlined theoretical considerations in both areas
humor theories and discourse comprehension (see next chapter for a more detailed de-
scription). GP jokes are usually quite short texts that unify the outlined character of
humorous stimuli with the exploitation of semantic-pragmatic discourse comprehension
mechanisms.4 The “grandfather joke” of the general introduction can serve as an ex-
ample of a GP joke. In this kind of joke, an initially dominant interpretation of an
ambiguous textual input is automatically generated. The initially dominant interpreta-
tion turns out to be false at the ending of the text. New surprising linguistic input is
presented. This input violates the semantic coherence of the discourse. The recipient
has to find an alternative hidden joke interpretation that then allows to re-establish
the semantic coherence of the text. In combination with some absurdity, or “inappro-
priateness” (Ritchie, 2004, p.64) of this hidden interpretation, this radical change of
the mental representation triggers the emotional reaction amusement or mirth (Martin,
2007, p.8). The detection of the incoherence and the retrieval of the new semantic
content that re-establishes the coherence of the text can be considered as processing
equivalents of what is referred to as incongruity and incongruity-resolution stages in
humor theories (e.g., Suls, 1972). In agreement with the outlined theories on verbal
humor, the neuro-cognitive processing of GP jokes is hypothesized to follow a sequential
process: (i) automatic interpretation that relies on a committed false belief, (ii) the
detection of the violation of the coherence, (iii) re-interpretation and re-establishment
of the coherence, and (iv) emotional reaction. This sequential process will be at the
core of this dissertation project. It will be investigated theoretically and empirically.
4The basic GP mechanism, however, can be implemented also by longer texts, discourses, or even
novels and films, not necessarily restricted to short jokes.
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1.5 Research Questions and Scope of the Disserta-
tion
Both fields of research humor comprehension and discourse comprehension deal with a
complex interaction between a stimulus and a recipient who perceives and elaborates
this stimulus. Accordingly, an investigation of the processing of GP jokes needs to
account for factors on both sides. On the stimulus side there are certain inherent
linguistic and humor-specific features. These factors manifest themselves in a recipient’s
mind. The recipient draws automatic default inferences, aims to maintain a coherent
representation, detects the incongruity, resolves the incongruity, and elaborates (Wyer
& Collins, 1992) the humorous potential. On the recipient side, certain inter-individual
and intra-individual characteristics presumably determine how the stimulus features are
perceived and processed.
This dissertation is an interdisciplinary project at the interface of cognitive psychology
and cognitive linguistics. The processing of GP jokes will be approached by theoretical
elaborations of the underlying concepts and by experimental-empirical investigations of
possible correlates and measure variables of these underlying theoretical concepts. For
both sides empirical correlates of the theoretical concepts are investigated. The investi-
gation embodies an explicit focus on a subclass of verbal humor. This focus allows more
specific conclusions. The aims of the project accordingly are: (i) theoretical elaboration
of the hypothesized processing of verbal GP humor. This theoretical approach includes
the adaptation of existing theories about verbal humor and the development of a theo-
retical and methodological tool box for the investigation of verbal GP humor; (ii) finding
empirical evidence for the hypothesized processing of verbal GP humor. This empiri-
cal evidence consists of quasi-replication and refinement of previous findings for highly
comparable stimulus material, and of new evidence related to new research designs and
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new methods.
1.6 Outline and Methodological Approaches
This thesis will be structured based on three independent manuscripts. One has been
published, one is currently under revision in a peer-reviewed journal, and one is in
the final preparation for submission to a peer-reviewed journal. The second chapter
is an extraction of a theoretical contribution in a collection of linguistic articles called
“Developments in linguistic humor theories” edited by Marta Dynel. Three important
concepts related to the processing of GP jokes are depicted and developed within a
neuro-cognitive and probabilistic frame work of discourse and humor comprehension:
salience, accessibility, and humorous potential (Mayerhofer & Schacht, 2013). The third
chapter is a report of a series of empirical experiments that investigated the sequential
nature of the neuro-cognitive processing of GP jokes. The joke processing is compared to
two manipulations of these jokes. These manipulations resulted in coherent texts on the
one side and totally incoherent texts on the other side. The report describes the stimulus
material, a self-paced reading time study, and three ERP studies. The first ERP study
also included the investigation of the pupillary response. The report embodies partly a
quasi-replication of previous findings and partly presents new experimental data that can
shed light on the general nature of the comprehension process of GP jokes. The fourth
chapter is a report of a self-paced reading time study in which contextual constraint on
the processing of GP jokes was manipulated by a priming paradigm. This design allowed
the investigation of theoretical concepts which are depicted as determining factors on
the processing of GP jokes in the second chapter. In the final chapter, the implications




2.1 Garden Path Joke
Text comprehension is a peculiar phenomenon. Given the complexity of the dynamic
interplay between linguistic input, world knowledge, contextual knowledge, and infer-
ential and internal monitoring processes, it is impressive that di↵erent individuals end
up with mostly similar mental representations out of an accumulation of letters, words,
and their grammatical realizations. Verbal humor in general, but in particular, a phe-
nomenon, which can be referred to as garden path (GP) joke, exploits this relationship
in such a way that it o↵ers a very suitable field for the study of discourse comprehension
processes.
Suls’s (1972) two stage model of humor depicts a general mechanism. According to this
model, expectations built up by a recipient of a humorous discourse are violated. If the
recipient finds a rule that accounts for the violation of the expectation, the incongruity
can be resolved. This sequential process of incongruity and resolution is supposed to
trigger the humorous reaction. The two-stage model is very general and is claimed
to underlie all jokes. However, humorous texts are heterogeneous and show various
mechanisms, one of which is the GP mechanism. The GP mechanism, despite varying
terminology, has been implicitly mentioned by several authors in the field of humor
research (e.g., Dascal, 1985; Raskin, 1985; Attardo & Raskin, 1991; Norrick, 2001).
Other authors have explicitly focused on the GP mechanism and suggested a specific
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classification of this type of joke (e.g., Dynel, 2009; Hockett, 1973; Yamaguchi, 1988).
In its basic form, the GP mechanism could be described as follows: an ambiguous set-
up of a text, usually the beginning of the text, lures a reader into building up one
predominant interpretation. The expectations and mental representations according to
this interpretation are subsequently violated at the punch-line, which is usually at the
end of the text. The punch-line refers to the cue in the text that signals the reader
that the current interpretation is not correct. Here, the reader has to overcome the
incoherence of the text. The initially predominant interpretation of the set-up gets
replaced by an alternative, hidden interpretation of it. Ritchie (2004, p.61) introduced
a very helpful formalization and terminology in his so-called “forced re-interpretation
model”. According to his suggestions, important elements in this type of jokes are: (i) an
initially dominant interpretation of the set-up (SU1), (ii) an alternative interpretation
of the set-up (SU2), (iii) the meaning of the punch-line (PL), (iv) an interpretation (I)
attained by integrating PL and SU2. The relationships between these elements and
some further notions will be adapted probabilistically in the present account. In terms
of their structure, GP jokes are similar to the well-studied GP sentences. In the latter,
the initial interpretation turns out to lead to a syntactical ungrammaticality. In GP
jokes, the whole discourse is incoherent on a semantic or pragmatic level as long as
the initial interpretation is not substituted by the hidden joke interpretation. GP jokes
are semantically incongruent according to the recipient’s mental representation, which is
constructed during the comprehension of the text. This di↵erence between GP sentences
and GP jokes will be demonstrated in the following examples.
(1) The boat floated down the river sank. (Bever, 1970) (GP sentence)
(2) The boy hit the girl with the glasses. (Syntactically ambiguous sentence,
sometimes also referred to as a GP sentence)
(3) The boy hit the girl with the glasses. He wished he had had a base-ball
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bat instead of the glasses as a weapon. (GP joke based on parsing 1)
(4) The boy hit the girl with the base-ball bat. Then, he ran away because
he was afraid of her base-ball bat. (GP joke based on parsing 2)
(5) A lady went into a clothing store and asked: “May I try on that dress
in the window?” “Well,” replied the sales clerk doubtfully: “don’t you think
it would be better to use the dressing room.” (GP joke taken from Ritchie,
2004)
In (1), the initially dominant syntactic parsing is an active construction. The occurrence
of the final verb forces a reader to re-organize the syntactical parsing by understanding
that “floated” appears in the function of a participle. It introduces a reduced passive
relative construction rather than serving as the verb of the main clause. This is discov-
ered only at the end when one reads the final verb “sank”. In order to understand the
sentence as a grammatically correct one, the recipient is forced to reprocess the initial
parsing. Here, the changes are quite restricted to the syntactical level. The syntacti-
cal changes might also alter the semantic representation. In this example, one needs
to enrich the representation by an unknown subject that is needed to “float down the
boat”. However, the reanalysis only leads to a minor change of the recipient’s mental
representation.
Other types of syntactically ambiguous sentences, as Example (2) or the customer’s
question in Example (5), are sometimes also called GP sentences even though there
is no ungrammaticality involved. A reader is not forced to re-process the syntactical
parsing. These phrases are only syntactically ambiguous. In (2), the context should
bias the recipient towards a parsing which attaches the noun phrase (“the glasses”) to
the girl because of background knowledge. It seems more plausible that glasses are
used as a seeing aid than as a weapon. Dynel (2009, p.129) argues that syntactical
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ambiguity is not well suited for the creation of GP joke-induced humor, probably due
to the lack of semantic contrast between two syntactical interpretations. This contrast
is supposed to be necessary for the incongruity; hence for the humorous potential. She
claims that syntactical ambiguity is not conducive to a GP joke unless it is “intertwined
with lexical ambiguity” (Dynel, 2009, p.130). More generally, however, syntactically
ambiguous sentences are suitable for GP jokes, if the initially predominant representa-
tion – based on the initially dominant parsing – becomes incoherent on a semantic level
of the discourse, as in the reply of the sales clerk in (5). Also (2) becomes a GP joke, a
mildly amusing one admittedly, if one adds a sentence as in Example (3). This sentence
makes the discourse incoherent according to the initially dominant interpretation. The
comprehension involves a change in the mental semantic representation of the discourse.
Comparing the GP sentence (1) with the GP jokes (3), (4), and (5) reveals that in the
latter examples the violation occurs on a semantic level. Example (1) is a syntactically
incorrect sentence until the syntactical parsing is updated. In the GP jokes (3, 4,
and 5), all sentences remain syntactically correct even if one does not re-organize the
initial parsing of the first sentence. However, the semantic violation triggers discourse
incoherence, and this incoherence forces the reader to resolve it. The ambiguity of a GP
joke can occur on various linguistic levels. Some kinds, e.g. phonological, referential,
pragmatic (based on presupposition or implicatures) ambiguities, appear more often
than others (see Dynel, 2009, p.117↵., for a detailed classification of di↵erent types of
ambiguity in GP humor).
One important observation, described in more detail by Ritchie (2006), is that sometimes
the reader is directly led up the garden path as in (3), but in some cases, the reader is only
indirectly led up the garden path. In the latter instances, the reader follows a character
in the story with the wrong interpretation, as in (5). In other jokes, only a character is led
up the garden path but the reader is not. Here, the humor arises due to the discrepancy
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between the knowledge of the reader and the character’s false belief in a story. The term
GP joke should not cover these latter instances. The distinction can be very di cult, as
one might realize if one analyses (5) very carefully. In this example, the ambiguity arises
on a more complex level, namely on the assumption that the sales clerk would parse the
customer’s syntactically ambiguous question according to the most dominant parsing, as
probably does the reader of the story. The story, however, carries the possibility that the
sales clerk intentionally or unintentionally misunderstands the customer and responds,
following the less salient syntactical parsing. Therefore, the discourse incoherence in
the joke is not primarily due to the ungrammaticality of the salient parsing structure
of the question. The sales clerk’s answer rather violates the assumption that the sales
clerk understands the customer correctly and behaves ordinarily. The resolution of this
incoherence is based on the interpretation of the whole discourse. One has to realize
that the sales clerk misunderstood the customer’s syntactically ambiguous question.
Dynel (2009), building up on the graded salience hypothesis by Giora (2003) and on
Levinson’s work of presumptive meanings (2000), points out two important features of
GP jokes: (i) the salience of the initially dominant interpretation and (ii) the “cancella-
bility” of this initial interpretation. Salience refers to the fact that one interpretation
of an ambiguous (linguistic) input is preferred automatically, that is without e↵ort and
is made by default. Cancellability refers to the possibility of retracting the initial in-
terpretation in the light of contrary textual input, i.e. the violation of the coherence of
the discourse as in GP jokes. Both factors are related to the initially dominant inter-
pretation. For the understanding of GP jokes, however, it is essential to focus also on
the accessibility of the non-salient, hidden meaning. The hidden interpretation has to
be activated in order to resolve the discourse incoherence. Accessibility, as a connection
between human memory structures and language comprehension, has been applied to
the comprehension of humorous riddles (De Palma & Weiner, 1992). To our knowledge,
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so far, it has played no explicit role in the research on GP jokes. Accessibility, in the
current context, refers to the di culty of finding the alternative interpretation. Refer-
ring to the examples again: on the one hand, the hidden interpretation of (3) and (4)
seems to involve less inferential processes than the one in (5). Examples (3) and (4) only
demand new syntactical parsing, whereas (5) requires the higher-order representation
of the false-belief of the sales clerk’s wrong syntactical parsing. On the other hand, it
might be less straight-forward to think of the use of glasses as a weapon than to think
of a naked woman in a shop window. The latter could make the alternative syntactical
parsing in (5) more easy than in (4). As a result the overall-accessibility for (5) could
nevertheless be higher than for (4), despite the higher number of necessary inferential
steps.
2.2 Probabilistic, Non-monotonic Models of Discourse
Comprehension
As any other phenomenon of perception and interpretation, language processing can be
understood as a stochastic process; i.e. it involves an intuitive engagement of knowl-
edge about probabilities and statistical properties of linguistic elements. One constantly
needs to solve a problem to choose from a (theoretically) infinite number of possible in-
terpretations for a given textual input only one interpretation which seems the relevant
one given the input, the context, and the recipient’s and the speaker’s background knowl-
edge. Considering all possibilities carries the risk of combinatorial explosion. Thus, a
recipient usually settles on one interpretation unless there is no good interpretation to
be found or unless there are two or more competing interpretations with equally bal-
anced plausibility (see Hurley et al., 2011). A text is never ready-made but only delivers
material for the construction of a supposedly intended meaning. For example, beginning
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a story with “There were a dog and a cat in the living room . . . ” could activate a wide
range of possible semantic representations. On a spatial level, they could sit peacefully
next to each other. The cat may be sitting on the dog, the dog may be sitting on the
cat, the dog may be chasing the cat, or the cat may be chasing the dog. The list can
be quite arbitrarily continued with compatible interpretations. However, there seems to
be a decreasing order of plausibility, which can be formulated in terms of probabilities.
The default interpretation seems to be a combination of the most prototypical situation
including a cat and a dog. It is retrieved from knowledge and might involve pragmatic
inferences (e.g., that the very small dog is sitting on the huge cat would be such a re-
markable situation that one might assume that it should have been made explicit by a
cooperative speaker). This knowledge is combined with the context of the utterance (if I
just had watched a documentary about the cruelty of animals, the chasing interpretation
might have received a stronger plausibility due to some priming e↵ect of availability).
Ambiguity is a ubiquitous feature of language and texts. Yet, communication usually
succeeds surprisingly well, and ambiguities are resolved very fast and correctly, i.e. in
the way intended by a speaker. The probabilistic turn in competence models of the psy-
chology of human reasoning (Oaksford & Chater, 2007) has also a↵ected cognitive lin-
guistics. Probabilistic models of language processing are rising in popularity (Jurafsky,
2003; Chater & Manning, 2006). In particular, Bayesian belief nets or networks appear
to be a fruitful field for the future of probabilistic language processing.
Recall that the advantage of a Bayesian approach to language processing is
that it gives a model of what probability to assign to a particular belief, and
how these beliefs should be updated in the light of new evidence. (Jurafsky,
2003, p.30)
Bayesian networks are a model for knowledge representation with directed a-cyclic
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graphs. Nodes, representing specific events, are connected by edges. The edges be-
tween these nodes represent a conditional dependency between the nodes. The strength
of the dependency is measured as a subjective probability assigned to it. Consider the
classic “Tweety example” as in (6).
(6) Tweety is a bird. Therefore, Tweety can fly.
The underlying knowledge which allows the hearer to conclude that Tweety is able to fly
can be formulated as a conditional event with a subjectively assigned probability. If x is
a bird (A), it (normally) can fly (B), P (B|A) = .95 for example, read as the probability
of B (ability to fly) given A (being a bird) as predicates of the entity x. Tweety, however,
might be a bird which was born without wings. Tweety, for any reason, may have never
learned how to fly. One can never be absolutely sure. But one can build up coherent
beliefs of the events unfolding in the environment and assign subjective probabilities to
them. The epistemic caution about Tweety’s ability to fly is reflected by a probability
that is slightly lower than 1. The probability of .95 indicates a very high degree of
belief (cf. De Finetti, 1970). But it is not a certain fact. If I find out that Tweety is a
penguin, however, the new evidence changes the picture. This information might have
been intentionally withheld by the communication partner. The new premise has to be
integrated within the discourse representation. Belief revision occurs and the result of it
is a much lower probability for the conclusion about Tweety’s ability to fly (see Pfeifer
& Kleiter, 2010, for a detailed account of the Tweety example), P (x is able to fly | x
is a bird ^ x is a penguin) = .01, for example; read as the probability of x’s ability to
fly given that x is a bird and that x is a penguin. The probability is not 0 because one
might think of a super-penguin with the superpower of flying.
A probabilistic model for discourse comprehension by applying the idea of Bayesian
networks o↵ers several suitable characteristics: (i) it is incremental; i.e. new input can
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be integrated as soon as it emerges (on-line); (ii) it is non-monotonic; i.e. previously
drawn conclusions and interpretations can be retracted in the light of contradicting
input; and (iii) it is independent from the type of knowledge which has to be engaged.
Linguistic knowledge like the frequency of specific parsing structures or concepts and
categorization in the mental lexicon can be formulated in the same way as contextual
background knowledge, social knowledge, or pragmatic knowledge. They can all be
formulated as probabilistic conditional dependencies. It does not mean that a recipient
of the discourse constantly and explicitly calculates probabilities with precise numbers.
The claim is, however, that a human mind carries out these stochastic processes in an
intuitive and unconscious way. Our Tweety example does seem structurally similar to
a GP joke. A default interpretation of the premise is exploited in order to trick the
recipient into inferring an incorrect conclusion, if Tweety turns out to be a penguin.
One will certainly not burst out into laughter but some mild forms of amusement and
the acknowledgement of a witty cognitive experience might occur, and it seems plausible
to create a GP joke based on the “Tweety components”.
2.3 Probabilistic Salience
As described in the previous section, language processing, to a great extent, has to
deal with uncertainty, vagueness, and ambiguity. The resolution of ambiguity is still
a highly debated issue. The main questions are: firstly, the time course of alternative
activations (sequential or parallel) and, secondly, the di↵erent weights of the influences
biasing a recipient towards one of the alternatives. Are these impacts stronger by lin-
guistic features than by contextual factors, or vice versa, or are they equally important?
The Graded Salience Hypothesis (Giora, 1997, 2003) assumes that language expressions
carry “degrees of salience”. This means that in the case of meaning construction based
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on an ambiguous utterance, the preference of one meaning over the other is graded,
according to di↵erent linguistic factors. Context factors play a minor role in this ac-
count. Four main factors have an impact on the degree of salience of one interpretation:
conventionality, frequency, familiarity, and prototypicality (stereotypicality) of the lin-
guistic expression. In the case of GP jokes, this seems very plausible if they rely on
ambiguities related to the mental lexicon. In many cases, the salience of one meaning
is not as clear because it is a more complex chunk of words. Dynel (2009) additionally
subscribes to the possibility of priming e↵ects by the context or co-text. According to
Dynel’s account, the salience in GP jokes, which do not rely on a lexical ambiguity,
can be described within models of “default reasoning” (Bach, 1984) and “presumptive
meanings” (Levinson, 2000). These models assume, just as in the present account, that
in the absence of clear evidence for one specific interpretation of a communicative act,
recipients activate default interpretations. Default interpretations are the interpreta-
tions which involve the lowest processing e↵ort. They do not need conscious inferential
e↵ort. Nevertheless, pragmatic inferences have to take place. This concept of default
reasoning is crucial. The question, however, remains by which precise cognitive mecha-
nisms one interpretation suddenly pops up as the e↵ortless first conclusion. Probabilistic
competence models of human reasoning may o↵er an answer to this question. In the
case of GP jokes, it would be helpful to adapt a model that can account for a wide
range of ambiguity types in a straightforward manner. In addition, the model has to be
incremental and non-monotonic, in order to account for the flexible and quick on-line
interpretation and re-interpretation processes during discourse comprehension.
Among many other linguistic phenomena, syntactical ambiguity, such as in GP sen-
tences, has successfully been studied within the framework of probabilistic constraint-
satisfaction models (MacDonald & Seidenberg, 2006; Seidenberg & MacDonald, 1999).
Traditionally, the preference for one interpretation of the syntactical ambiguity has
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been described by the structurally based heuristics of the garden path model (Frazier
& Clifton Jr, 1997; Frazier & Fodor, 1978). The heuristics are “minimal attachment”,
i.e. the reader prefers the simplest, the least demanding parsing structure, and the “late
closure” approach, i.e. new words or phrases are attached to the actual clause. As a
consequence of these heuristics, only one interpretation is maintained at a time. This
leads to a sequential model of ambiguity resolution. Much empirical research on GP
sentences, however, supports a multi-faceted account, in which several linguistic and
non-linguistic cues are integrated in a very fast and dynamic way. These cues lead to
constraints on the syntactical parsing, based on probabilistic knowledge (for a review
see MacDonald & Seidenberg, 2006).
Probabilistic models allow quite precise empirical predictions and can also be imple-
mented on a computational level. For example, Jurafsky (2003) successfully applied a
Bayesian model to sentence processing of syntactical ambiguity. The model took into
account several di↵erent factors known to have an impact on the dominant main clause
parsing of a GP sentence. The model succeeded on a computation level, as well as on
an empirical level by predicting human processing of these sentences. A further ad-
vantage of probabilistic models of ambiguity resolution is that they can be applied to
various kinds of ambiguities. Therefore, they can also be applied to GP jokes in which
no structural heuristics can be used, since the ambiguity is not based on the syntactical
parsing.
How can the mind be so easily tricked to stick and commit to one interpretation? One
can hardly succeed in resisting the default reasoning. Hurley et al. (2011) o↵er a neuro-
cognitive theory on humor which can shed light on this question. In order to understand
the necessity of default reasoning and salient interpretations in the form of committed
beliefs, they claim, one needs to dive into the mechanisms of the human cognitive system
and the way knowledge might be stored and used for the purpose of selecting beliefs
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about the individual’s environment. Humans constantly face a di cult problem, namely
to find the optimal balance between two essential skills in evolution. On the one hand,
individuals have to be able to carry out actions, decisions, and judgments quickly and
correctly by relying on their interpretations of the reality and the conclusions drawn,
based on these interpretations. On the other hand, humans need to be able to adapt very
flexibly, fast, and correctly to new unexpected evidence; especially if this new evidence
is contrary to the committed beliefs and interpretations they have based their actions
and decisions on. Failing to do so would impede learning; and in the long term, the
ability to survive. Hurley et al. (2011) argue convincingly that humor has developed
as an emotional reward for human beings to overcome covertly entered false beliefs.
These erroneous, but committed beliefs should be recognized before they become long-
term memory structures. If they were not abandoned, this would make it even more
di cult for the next time to build up the correct interpretation. The emotional benefits
of a humorous experience motivate individuals to engage in the demanding activity of
debugging the interpretational system. This e↵ort is not pleasant, but the emotional
reaction to humor makes it a pleasant experience.
This principle of committing to one interpretation but being flexible enough to change
the interpretation in the light of new evidence also applies to communication, and GP
jokes are a good illustration. Facing an ambiguous linguistic structure, the hearer of the
utterance has to decide on one interpretation and commits to it. Otherwise, due to the
infinite interpretative alternatives, communication would not be possible. One could
not take for granted anything. If the recipient has to commit to one interpretation for
the sake of mutual understanding, the best guess is the most probable/most plausible
interpretation given the factual linguistic input, the co-text, the back-ground knowledge
(including familiarity, conventionality, prototypicality, frequency, genre-specificity, etc.
of a given utterance), empathic representation of the speaker’s mind, pragmatic infer-
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ences, and the context of the utterance. Therefore, the salience of an interpretation
might best be modeled as a probabilistic function of these factors. This can also explain
why the salience of an interpretation is not only dependent on specific individuals, but
also on context, linguistic and non-linguistic knowledge, and might even vary in one
individual from one case to another. A set of alternative interpretations can be ranked
by their assigned probabilities. Only the one with the highest ranking is entertained.
It is the only interpretation the recipient is consciously aware of, whilst there might
be other interpretations that are activated (at least to a small degree) but a recipient
is not consciously aware of them. In the case of equally probable interpretations, one
might not be committed to one interpretation but might oscillate between one and the
other, or possibly remain undecided. However, one interpretation has to come first.
By analyzing Example (7), I will try to exemplify the probabilistic salience of the first
interpretation. In the same way as in the “Tweety example”, it is possible to capture
the knowledge engaged for the interpretation of the semantic features of the non-explicit
character of the utterance (7).
(7) “Mummy, I just turned 14 years. May I please, finally, be allowed to
wear a bra and make up?”
This utterance is very unspecific about the location, the time, and the characters in-
volved in the story. Most of all, however, the ambiguity is the underspecification of the
character’s identity. The character’s identity has to be enriched by the reader of this
story. Background knowledge can be formulated again as probabilistic knowledge in the
form of a conditional probability. A 14 year-old character x is expecting to wear a bra
and make-up. The most likely interpretation based on a typical recipient’s probabilistic
knowledge is that x, the unknown speaker of the utterance is a girl by the following (au-
tomatic) inference: If x expects to wear a bra and make-up (A), x usually is a girl (B),
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P (B|A) = .8  .97.1 The strength of the degree of belief might depend on the recipient’s
stereotypical gender knowledge. There is an infinite number of other possibilities. x
could be a boy, it could be a speaking dog, it could even be an alien. In order to avoid
a combinatorial explosion of infinite possibilities, the cognitive system has to take it for
granted that the most probable interpretation is the one intended by the speaker of the
discourse. This interpretation leads to a semantic representation of a girl talking to her
mother, the salient interpretation.
However, the main contextual information here is that this example is printed in a
scientific article about GP jokes. This context could influence the reading. The reader
suspects that the utterance aims to lead him/her up the garden path. This skepticism
could also be accounted for in the model. Given the expectation (A) of x and the
contextual information (C), namely a scientific analysis of GP jokes, the probability of
B, i.e. x being a girl, might be assigned a lower probability. Let us say: P (B|A^C) = .7.
Someone may even imagine having read a newspaper story about transvestites just
before reading this chapter. This might have a↵ected his/her knowledge, permanently
or temporarily in such a strong way that he/she does not believe gender stereotypes.
If the recipient also assumes that the person telling him/her this story shares the same
knowledge, then the expectation of wearing a bra and make-up is not a strong cue for x
being a girl at all. Therefore, the probability of the interpretation of x being a girl would
be very weak, and the recipient would not commit strongly to this one interpretation.
1All probabilities are subjectively assigned, and therefore quite arbitrary numbers that could be
more or less similar to the ones of possible readers. However, note that a basic assumption of Bayesian
networks is that di↵erent individuals have di↵erent assignments of probabilities.
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2.4 Discourse Incoherence
If a GP joke works, the recipient has decided on one salient interpretation and has
accordingly built up an internal representation of the scenario in the text. If nothing
in the discourse forces the reader to re-think the initially salient interpretation, there is
no need to doubt the correctness of this most probable interpretation; just as someone
commits to the belief that the sun will rise every day in the morning given that the
sun so far has risen every morning. That the sun would stop rising would qualify as
unexpected new evidence, which is not coherent with the person’s beliefs. It seems
to be a core feature of the human mind that a violation of an established internal
representation of the events in the environment, based on the theories and knowledge
one has gathered, forces one to re-arrange the cognitive representation of the events.
This innate need for coherence also applies to communication. Faced with the answer
to the question of the (presumably) 14-year old girl, as in (8) the reader might have a
similar experience.
(8) “Mummy, I just turned 14 years. May I please, finally, be allowed to
wear a bra and make up?” -“No, and eat up your soup, my son.”
The punch-line (PL) is not coherent according to the default interpretation of the set-up,
namely that the character in question is a girl. The discourse becomes incoherent for
a moment, formulated as a conditional probability: P (SU1|A ^ PL) < .1. Again, the
probability of SU1, namely that x is a girl, becomes very low, given A that x expects
to wear a bra and make-up, and given the PL that the mother calls x “son”. The low
probability of the interpretation forces one to abandon some of the underlying committed
beliefs which render the discourse incoherent. Two important factors might influence
the degree of incoherence. One is the resulting probability or plausibility according to
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the knowledge when trying to integrate the new evidence. The other is the possibility
of “explaining it away” by adapting some auxiliary assumptions. For example, one way
to keep the interpretation of x being a girl could be to assume that for some reason the
mother just likes to call her daughter “son”, which is not usual but still possible. In such
a case, the committed belief would not be altered. The core of the initial interpretation
remains untouched. The recipient integrates the new evidence without retracting the
predominant interpretation, but the resulting discourse remains incoherent to a certain
degree. More likely, however, is another option: the incoherence of this discourse would
trigger the search for alternative interpretations if the degree of incoherence would reach
a certain threshold.
2.5 Accessibility
The third important feature in the comprehension of a GP joke is the accessibility of
knowledge which enables the retrieval of at least one alternative interpretation in or-
der to re-establish a coherent discourse. The concept of accessibility was mentioned by
De Palma and Weiner (1992) for the comprehension of humorous riddles which were
based on lexical ambiguity. The authors explicitly argued in favor of a relationship be-
tween accessibility and knowledge representation, even though their account was limited
to lexical knowledge. Analogously to the degree of salience, accessibility can be thought
of as a graded phenomenon. This should become intuitively clear by comparing the
“mummy” joke with Example (9):
(9) “Susie, why do you feed your cat with seeds?” -“Because seeds are the
favorite food of my bird.”
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Example (9) is probably best classified as a joke which exploits the crossroad mechanism
(Dynel, 2009, p.29↵.). In this kind of joke, no rational interpretation of the set-up is
likely to be found by a recipient. Therefore, no default reasoning takes place, and
the recipient has to await the information at the punch-line for the establishment of a
coherent discourse. There are cases in which the mechanisms may overlap (Dynel, 2012).
In this joke, the set-up contains incomprehensible elements. Susie’s absurd behavior
creates the incoherence already during the set-up of the text. This incoherence cannot
be resolved without the help of the punchline. Therefore, no clear initially dominant
interpretation can exist. However, at least some inferences are made by default even
though they do not lead to a totally coherent interpretation of the discourse. The
speaker of the question is assumed to be an adult, and Susie is accordingly assumed
to be a child, for example. One basic assumption is that Susie feeds the cat with the
intention of feeding the cat (SU1). This assumption is default and automatic. It is
the most plausible interpretation given the textual input of the first speaker’s question
(A). The final word, bird, which serves as the punch-line2 (PL) semantically violates
SU1; formulated as a conditional probability, P (SU1|A ^ PL) < .05, the probability
of the first interpretation given the character’s question and the PL becomes very low,
leading to additional incoherence. Example (9) is not a textbook GP example. The GP
mechanism, however, is partly involved. One of the default assumptions, namely the
2There seems to be confusion about the precise span of linguistic elements which form the PL. This
question could possibly be answered by substitution tests. Instead of “bird”, there could be “cat”, and
that would change the whole text into a non-joke. Changing “bird” to “my tweety”, or “my canary”,
or maybe even to “my mouse” etc. would not alter the joke. The substituting concept has to be
compatible with the representation of Susie’s belief about a small pet being alive in the belly of the cat.
“My monkey” would not work. If the utterance were changed into “My bird is hungry”, the text would
still be pretty much the same joke. These arguments speak for a locally restricted conceptualization of
the PL. On the other hand, the full utterance must be processed for the message to arise completely.
Accordingly, the whole final utterance should be considered the PL. Nevertheless, the recipient might
already be able to understand the joke as soon as the word “bird” emerges even if it were at the
beginning of the utterance. Such a position of the PL would probably just destroy the tension and the
timing of the joke. Psychologically, “bird” is the precise element which adds the incoherence and which
triggers the retrieval of the alternative interpretation. So, even though the whole utterance can be
considered the PL, “bird” (or one of its compatible substitutes) is the crucial disambiguating element.
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one about Susie’s intention turns out to be false. Independently from the classification
of the joke, the re-establishment of a coherent semantic representation in this example
involves a more complex, e↵ortful, and inferential retrieval of knowledge than in other
examples: Susie is a child, children have limited knowledge about biology, cats eat birds,
the cat ate the bird, the bird is in the belly of the cat, Susie has a false belief that the
bird is still alive in the belly of the cat. SU2, “Susie wants to feed her bird but it is dead
because it was eaten by the cat”, is the most probable interpretation given A and PL.
The retrieval of the knowledge requires more inferential steps and higher-order belief
representations. Therefore, the hidden interpretation might be much harder to find than
that in Example (8).
The degree of accessibility refers to the ease of retrieving the hidden interpretation in
order to overcome the incoherent discourse. It can be described as a function of several
multi-dimensional factors. On the side of textual features, probable influences on the
accessibility are: (i) the number of necessary inferential steps, (ii) the involvement
of mental representations of false beliefs or di↵erent perspectives, (iii) the semantic
distance between the concepts involved, (iv) frequency, prototypicality, conventionality,
and familiarity of the concepts (as suggested for the degree of salience by Giora, 1997,
2003), (v) genre-knowledge, (vi) the contextual influences on the text, e.g. by semantic
priming. Since there always has to be a recipient involved, some influences on the
recipient’s part should be considered: (i) executive function skills, (ii) pragmatic skills,
(iii) degree of exposure to specific forms of verbal humor, (iv) context factors on the
person (such as having heard a similar joke before or having read about cats eating
birds), (v) autistic-like traits or other personality variables.
The basic idea of accessibility appears to be compatible with the “frame shifting”
(Coulson, 2001) model postulated for the comprehension of jokes (Coulson & Kutas,
1998; Coulson, 2001; Coulson & Oakley, 2005; Coulson, Urbach, & Kutas, 2006). The
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choice of di↵erent terminology in the present account is due to the limiting connotations
of the concept “frame”, originally postulated by Minsky (1975, 1977). A frame consists
of a memorized knowledge structure, i.e. a network of semantic relationships specific
for a given situation, like a “pet-frame”, which includes feeding or nursing, and, on the
other hand, a“predator-frame”which includes cruelty, prey, chasing, food-chain, etc. for
Example (9). Shifting from one semantic field to a completely di↵erent semantic field
is an essential feature of (most) GP jokes. However, in many cases (as in the following
Example (10)), more than only one specific knowledge structure seems to be necessarily
involved in the comprehension of discourse, such as a joke.
(10) How many mice do you need to screw in a light-bulb? Two, but the
tricky part is to get them inside.
Here, the recipient has to shift from a household frame to a sexuality frame. However,
it appears implausible to assume the existence of a specific frame for “mice screwing
in a light-bulb” as an established concept in the memory. The construction of such a
semantic representation is probably based on much richer associations than implied by
the idea of a “frame”. Further, not all jokes that are classified as GP jokes within the
present framework involve a complete shift between frames. Examples (3) and (4) both
involve the frame of physical violence among children, no matter whether the weapon
is a pair of glasses or a base-ball bat. Even if one is willing to allow for a more detailed
conceptualization of a frame, the important aspect of a GP joke seems to be the radical
change of the semantic representation of the discourse. This change might involve frame
shifting. However, it is mainly based on the revision of committed beliefs due to default
reasoning processes and on the re-arrangement of the activated knowledge in interaction
with the perceptual input.
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The accessibility of the hidden interpretation is, therefore, portrayed as the ease with
which the relevant knowledge for the explanation of the otherwise incoherent textual
input can be achieved. Once the hidden interpretation has been accessed, it has to
be probabilistically integrated in the discourse comprehension structure. In Example
(7), the comprehension relies on the knowledge that males sometimes feel the urge to
cross-dress. Even though it is not highly common that a boy wishes to wear a bra
and make-up, this knowledge seems quite easily accessible. One possible candidate for
the interpretation is SU2, namely that x is a boy who would love to cross-dress. The
probability of the second interpretation becomes high and replaces SU1 as the highest
ranked interpretation; P (SU2|A ^ PL) > P (SU1|A ^ PL). The subsequent process
of belief revision changes the semantic mental representation of the discourse. In the
philosophy of science, an analogous phenomenon is called a paradigm-shift (Kuhn, 1996).
Certain core aspects of a set of beliefs are consistently under strong attack. No minor
adaptations of the beliefs can accommodate the new evidence, but one has to apply a
completely new set of beliefs and explanations.3
2.6 Humorous Potential
The previous sections have avoided the most essential feature of GP jokes: they are
perceived as humorous. Humor is not an inherent feature of a stimulus, such as length
or weight, but it only arises as a result of dynamic interaction between some inherent
structural features of a stimulus and the perception and elaboration of the stimulus by
a recipient (see also Hurley et al., 2011, p.16–18). Dependent on these features, stimuli
carry di↵erent degrees of potential to be perceived as humorous. With respect to the
humorous potential of a GP joke, an important question is whether the GP structure
3The analogy between jokes and philosophy of science was pointed out by Ramachandran (1998).
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itself is already responsible for (at least a small portion) of the humor or whether the
GP structure is a mere delivery mechanism for a humorous idea, or the combination of
both. Incongruity models of humor (e.g., Nerhardt, 1977; Suls, 1972; McGhee, 1979;
Forabosco, 1992), despite their di↵erences in details, claim that a stimulus is perceived
as humorous if it is incompatible with an expected pattern. Incongruity arises due to
the comparison of a specific stimulus with its typical cognitive conceptualization as a
reference. For example, the typical scenario of a bus ride involves “getting on the bus”,
“buying a ticket”, “finding a seat”, “passengers”, etc. If there were a clown riding a
unicorn on the bus, it would be incompatible with the cognitive pattern of the familiar
scenario. This incongruity might trigger humor. Incongruity models bifurcate into two
main directions, depending on the importance of the resolution of the incongruity; i.e.
the necessity of finding an explanation for the presence of a clown riding a unicorn in
the present example.
In a similar manner, there seems to be no agreement as to what exactly creates the
incongruity in GP jokes. Very often there are di↵erent types of incongruity involved
(see the discussion about the “location of the incongruity” in Ritchie, 2009, p.316–319).
Applying the sequential two stages of Suls’s (1972) model, one could think that the
incongruity of a GP joke arises by the violation of an expectation on a communicative
level, i.e. by the GP mechanism itself. The resolution of this incongruity is then achieved
by finding the rule which accounts for the alternative interpretation and by arriving at
the coherent reading. This incongruity resolution is supposed to be the cause of the
amusement.
However, numerous, perhaps most jokes are incongruous, to a large extent, because
of incompatible elements within the story, the situation, or the characters depicted in
the joke. The incongruity is a “part of the conveyed scenario” (Ritchie, 2009, p.316).
These incongruous elements are not compatible with the expected pattern based on the
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recipient’s knowledge representation. No resolution seems to be necessary for this type
of incongruity. In the mummy example, a 14-year-old boy likes to cross-dress. This
idea is incompatible with the most prototypical pattern of a 14-year-old boy. Rothbart
and Pien (1977) introduced the distinction between “possible” and “impossible incon-
gruities”. They pointed out that only the first kind of incongruity can be resolved com-
pletely within the joke, while the latter kind of incongruity is based on conflicts within
the recipient’s world knowledge and does not need a complete resolution. Attardo,
Hempelmann, and Di Maio (2002) termed a comparable distinction “focal” vs. “back-
ground” incongruity. The focal incongruity is the essential mechanism of the joke, and
the secondary or background incongruity enforces the humorous potential of the focal
incongruity by introducing additional incongruous elements (see also Dynel, 2012, p.8–
9). Following this distinction, one can build a dichotomy between the focal, here also
called GP mechanism-based incongruity and the secondary or background incongruity
due to the incongruous content of a joke. In order to disentangle these two types of
incongruity, it is interesting to observe whether a transformation of the linguistic struc-
ture of a GP joke into a text without the GP mechanism could still be perceived as
humorous as in (11).
(11) Peter is 14 years old. He expects to be allowed to wear a bra and
make-up.
The point becomes much clearer with a transformation of joke (9) to Example (12):
(12) Susie’s bird was eaten by her cat. Susie feeds her cat with birdseeds
because she wants to feed her bird.
In this extreme of the dichotomy outlined, the humorous potential of the jokes is reduced
to the incongruous story elements. Some of the humorous potential might remain in
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Examples (11) and (12). The focal incongruity of Example (9) was analyzed as a com-
bination of two mechanisms. On the one hand, incongruity arises due to the crossroads
mechanism of a confusing set-up. On the other hand, additional incongruity arises due
to the violation of the interpretation that Susie has the intention of feeding the cat.
Resolution seems necessary both for the comprehension of the joke and for the appreci-
ation of the humor. In any case, as illustrated in (12), the representation of Susie’s false
logical reasoning seems to carry humorous potential independently from the underlying
mechanisms of the joke. The child thinks that she can feed a bird which was eaten
by the cat. This idea is incongruous compared to the recipient’s world knowledge and
possibly perceived as humorous on its own. But this is a question of taste and can only
be tested empirically.
The other extreme of the dichotomy might be a GP sentence as Example (1). Here, it
is hard to see humorous potential. The contrast between the representation of an active
construction “a boat floating down the river” and the representation of a passive con-
struction “a boat being floated down the river”might not be big enough for a humorous
experience (see Dynel, 2009, p.130). More importantly, there is nothing atypical about
the concept of a boat being floated down the river. There is no (secondary) background
incongruity involved. GP sentences are usually not considered to carry humorous po-
tential. If there is some humorous potential in the constructed GP joke (4), then it is
probably mainly the GP mechanism which is responsible. It might not be perceived as
highly humorous in the first place, but it presumably looses all humorous potential if
transformed into (13).
(13) The girl was carrying a baseball-bat. The boy hit the girl.
Ritchie (2004, p.61–63) discussed the contrast, the absurdity, and the inappropriateness
of the hidden interpretation as essential ingredients of incongruity-resolution accounts
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of humor in general, and of a GP joke in particular. However, one remaining question
is why these descriptive features, like incongruity or absurdity, evoke humor, as put
forward by Hurley et al. (2011). The probabilistic notion of knowledge representation
might overcome this lack. As mentioned earlier, the human mind needs a coherent set
of beliefs about its environment in order to function well, quickly, and e ciently for
adaptive behavior. A prerequisite is the categorization of objects, situations, and con-
cepts. Categorization is based on uncertainty. Categorization needs to be stable and
reliable, on the one hand, but flexible and adjustable, on the other hand. Successful
categorization needs to fulfill both criteria at the same time. Absurdity and incongruity
could be closely connected to the lack of prototypicality. As described, incongruity
arises due to surprising deviations of a stimulus in the context of a given “cognitive
model of reference” (Forabosco, 1992). Absurd or incongruous entities from a cognitive
psychological point of view might then be representations of highly improbable objects,
situations, and events in a common environment or their interpretations, respectively.
We assume that they are amusing because they enrich the probabilistic categorization.
They include surprising exceptions and unusual circumstances. Within the model of
Bayesian networks, they create or consolidate edges between nodes; i.e. associations
and relationships between concepts and events. They alter the conditional probabilities
among them and make the categorization of them more flexible. Accordingly, they help
the human mind to strengthen the adaptive power of integrating surprising new input
into existing categories. The focal (GP mechanism-based) incongruity, however, does
not extend the probabilistic categorization. Instead, it strongly violates the expecta-
tions that are based on a specific committed interpretation. This violation demands
that the recipients carry out a belief revision process, similar to what was described
as a paradigm-shift. A whole new set of explanations and categorizations has to be
retrieved for its resolution. Both notions of incongruity can be conducive to a humorous
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experience, but a combination of both types of incongruity might lead to a high degree
of humorous potential in a GP joke.
2.7 Empirical Assumptions and Evidence
One of the strengths of a probabilistic account is that it allows for precise empirical
predictions. Several hypotheses can be derived from the present account on GP jokes.
One hypothesis is related to the probabilistic concept of salience, one to the idea of
the accessibility of knowledge for the retrieval of the hidden interpretation, and one
concerns the humorous potential of a GP joke. In the following, I will present these
hypotheses separately and link them to empirical psycholinguistic data on GP jokes.
Further, possible empirical measurements and operationalization will be discussed and
outlined as ideas for potential future directions in this field of research.
The salience of the initially dominant interpretation was depicted as a function of prob-
abilistic knowledge representations. By applying the idea of a Bayesian belief network,
the source and the nature of the knowledge play a minor role. World knowledge, lin-
guistic, pragmatic, and contextual knowledge can all be equally integrated in such a
model, and the dominance of specific knowledge mainly depends on the stimulus type,
i.e. the type of ambiguity which is conducive to the GP mechanism. Since the degree of
salience determines the degree of the commitment to an initial interpretation, the first
hypothesis can be formulated as H1.
(H1) A higher degree of salience of the initial interpretation leads to a
stronger violation of the semantic coherence of a GP joke at the PL and
to a more di cult semantic integration of the PL.
The degree of salience can be quantified in a rather straightforward manner for precise
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linguistic elements in terms of corpora linguistic measures. Potential variables are the
frequency of a specific lexical meaning or a specific syntactic parsing structure out of
context. These data are available in existing data bases. Moreover, familiarity ratings
of specific linguistic elements or sentence completion tasks can provide further criteria
of quantification (Giora, 2003, p.21↵). However, given the complexity and the diversity
of the cues that are involved in the comprehension of a GP joke, such measures might
not be su cient. Indirect measures of the salience of a specific interpretation can be
obtained from response times in a lexical decision paradigm. In such a task, participants
have to decide whether a chain of letters is a correct word of a given language or not.
This decision follows the presentation of the linguistic element of interest. Assuming
that this linguistic element activates specific semantic networks, like gender knowledge
about girls, for example, then the following word can either be related to this semantic
network or not. If a word is semantically related to the semantic activation by the
previously presented linguistic element, then the lexical decision is facilitated. This
facilitation results in faster response times. The di↵erence between responses to related
and unrelated words, the priming e↵ect, can be used as an indirect measurement of
the salience of one specific interpretation. Such a paradigm has been conducted for
the salience of ironic statements and other forms of figurative language (e.g., Giora,
2003; Giora et al., 2007), showing shorter decision times for the words which are related
to the supposedly more salient interpretations like the literal meaning for irony and
figurative language. The interpretation of canned jokes was investigated with a priming
paradigm by Vaid, Hull, Heredia, Gerkens, and Martinez (2003). The stimuli were
not explicitly classified as GP jokes, but the majority of them was based on the GP
mechanism. Shorter decision times for words which were related to the initially dominant
interpretation of a joke during the set-up phase were found.
Another way to measure the salience could be a task in which participants are asked to
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indicate straight away the probability of a specific interpretation. This can be carried
out by analogy to the exemplary analysis of the salience of the mummy example I
suggested above. In such an approach, stimuli have to be carefully analyzed in terms
of the possibly engaged knowledge. An analyst needs to determine the cues and the
presumably dominant and hidden interpretations. Participants could then simply rate
on a scale the plausibility of the interpretations given the presented cues: e.g. “Given
that a 14-year-old individual expects to wear a bra and make-up, how confident are you
that this individual is female?” The ratings could then be used as a measurement for
the degree of salience and can also be related to the response times in lexical decisions.
Another feasible way could consist in a manipulation of the salience of a specific inter-
pretation by realizing a priming paradigm. Contextual priming in the present model
is included in the probabilistic function of salience. Therefore, presenting a lexical
prime – semantically related to the predominant interpretation – prior to the set-up of a
joke should increase the salience of the initial interpretation in comparison to unrelated
primes (e.g., presenting “doll” versus “table” in the mummy Example (1)).
Since hypothesis H1 predicts a relationship between the degree of salience and the degree
of violation of expectations and the di culty of semantic integration, reliable measures
are necessary for the latter concepts. Self-paced reading time, eye-tracking and ERP
data have been successfully used for the study of jokes that were described to rely on
frame-shifting (Coulson & Kutas, 1998, 2001; Coulson et al., 2006). In several studies,
the authors experimentally compared two conditions: In the straight endings condition,
the final word of a joke was substituted with an ending which did not violate the
initially dominant interpretation. The joke ending did violate the salient interpretation
and additionally needed a frame-shifting for a successful comprehension. In addition
to other relevant linguistic features, the authors matched the Cloze probability of the
endings between both conditions. The Cloze probability is derived from a task, in
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which participants have to complete a fragment of a text or a sentence. The number
of times a specific stimulus is completed with a specific word serves as the specific
Cloze probability. The findings indicated longer reading times on the final words of
joke endings compared to straight endings, even though the straight endings were as
unlikely to occur as the joke endings according to the Cloze probability measures. The
authors interpreted these results as empirical evidence for the processing e↵ort needed
for the frame-shifting. Coulson and co-workers (Coulson & Kutas, 2001; Coulson &
Lovett, 2004) found another interesting result. Some of the stimuli created a higher
constraint on the ending of the text than other stimuli; i.e. a subset of the stimuli
led to a very high Cloze probability of one specific ending. This ending was not used
for the final experiment but it highlights the constraint of the co-text on the ending.
Another subset of the stimuli had a low constraint on the ending of the text. We suggest,
that this high vs. low constraint on the final word of the text might be related to the
degree of salience. One interpretation is so dominant that most participants completed
the text according to this dominant interpretation. Interestingly, there was a significant
interaction between the reading times of the joke endings and the high vs. low constraint
distinction of the stimuli. A similar pattern was reported for the ERP data with the
same design and the same stimuli. The N400 is a negative-going ERP component, which
typically increases in amplitude with the degree of expectancy violations or with the
di culty of integrating words into their semantic context, respectively (Chwilla, Brown,
& Hagoort, 1995; Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). In the studies by Coulson and co-workers
(Coulson & Kutas, 2001; Coulson & Lovett, 2004), this component was only a↵ected
by high-constraint jokes. These data accordingly support H1 because the constraint
(possibly an indicator for the salience) interacted with two measures of the degree of
incoherence (reading times and N400 component). A proper operationalization of the
degree of salience, however, would shed more light on the empirical validity of H1.
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Accessibility was defined as the di culty of the retrieval of the relevant knowledge
necessary for the detection of the hidden joke interpretation. The degree of the ac-
cessibility was portrayed as a complex function. Textual features, mainly the number
of necessary inferential steps and the engagement of higher-order belief representations
are presumably intertwined with context influences and individual di↵erences among
readers. Based on this conceptualisation the following hypothesis (H2) can be derived
and empirically challenged.
(H2) The higher the degree of the accessibility of the hidden joke interpreta-
tion, the easier is the belief revision process needed to overcome the discourse
incoherence after the occurrence of PL.
Basically, this hypothesis predicts that a higher accessibility facilitates the process of
joke comprehension. Again, the problem of operationalizing the degree of accessibility
arises. The operationalization could be realized in several ways. A simple opportunity is
a precise text-linguistic analysis of the stimuli, focussing on the inferential and cognitive
e↵ort that is needed for the comprehension. For obvious reasons, such a task is sub-
jective and hardly feasible. A more reasonable strategy could be a manipulation of the
contextual influence. As already suggested for testing H1, a priming paradigm could be
realized. Here, words – again presented prior to the jokes – could prime the knowledge,
which has to be involved for successful joke comprehension. For the bird seeds example,
it might be su cient to present a word like “predator” in order to increase the degree of
accessibility for the comprehension of this joke. The priming should activate contents in
the semantic network that ease the retrieval of the inferential step that the cat ate the
bird, an essential causal enrichment for the comprehension process. A third possibility
for the manipulation of the accessibility is the choice of di↵erent sample groups split
by specific individual di↵erences or by di↵erent treatments before the experiment. Ver-
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bal intelligence score, executive skills, autistic-like traits, emphatic, or pragmatic skills
could be plausible factors that influence the accessibility on the participant’s side.
Di↵erent background information or mood induction could also influence the ability to
retrieve the necessary knowledge. For example, it has been shown that positive emotions
facilitate a global cognitive style. This global cognitive style in turn facilitates tasks that
rely on cognitive flexibility and mind set switching like creative problem solving. The
cognitive flexibility increases the dopamine level, which in turn leads to more positive
emotions (e.g., Ashby et al., 1999; Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004). Therefore, the induction
of a positive mood could facilitate the accessibility of the hidden interpretation.
Sensible indicators of the comprehension process involved could be (i) accuracy measures
in comprehension tasks or comprehension ratings, (ii) response times in the comprehen-
sion tasks, (iii) number and pattern of regressive eye movements in eye-tracking reading
tasks, (iv) self-paced reading times, and (v) ERP components, which are supposed
to reflect working memory engagement or repair processes (e.g., the P600 component;
Van Herten, Kolk, & Chwilla, 2005). Self-paced reading times after the occurrence
of PL, just as eye-tracking data, are quite problematic. Longer reading times for GP
jokes might be a mixture of the violation of an expectation and the e↵ort for a re-
establishment of a coherent text. It seems hard to disentangle them in terms of how
strongly the degree of salience impacted the data and how big the influence of the ac-
cessibility was. ERP data, however, suggest that the retrieval of the relevant knowledge
might be reflected by a specific ERP component reported by Coulson and co-workers
(Coulson & Kutas, 2001; Coulson & Lovett, 2004). In their study, the authors obtained
an enhanced left anterior negativity between 500 and 700 ms after the PL onset and
called it “frame-shifting component”. Interestingly, this component was stronger for
participants who were classified as good comprehenders. Good comprehenders simply
responded more accurately to the jokes. Since the comprehension score was presented
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as a di↵erent measure for the degree of accessibility, these data do not directly support
H2. But they speak for a convergent validity of the measures. The relationship be-
tween these measurements supports the idea that the ERP frame-shifting component
truly reflects the cognitive processes engaged for the retrieval of the knowledge for the
hidden joke interpretation. It is hypothesized that this component is triggered by a
higher working memory or executive skills engagement. Accordingly, the frame shifting
component could provide a reliable variable for testing H2.
As for the humorous potential, it seems utopian to make precise empirical predictions.
Too little is still understood about the“magic” ingredients that make jokes work. This is
related to the sheer complexity of di↵erent factors that have to be successfully combined
for an emotional experience of humor. One question which was posed in this article was
whether the humorous potential of a GP joke is based on the GP mechanism itself or
whether the incongruous elements of the story or the characters involved in the joke
are responsible for the amusement. Constructing stimuli on this dichotomy of focal
and background incongruity might provide an option for experimental testing. Sensible
indicators of emotional reactions to humor could be obtained by (i) questionnaires and
rating studies, and (ii) emotion-related psychophysiological changes like, for example,
changes of pupil diameter as an indicator of cognitive e↵ort and emotional arousal
(Bayer, Sommer, & Schacht, 2011).
2.8 Conclusion
The phenomenon of GP jokes was described in order to illustrate the dynamic interac-
tion between textual input and the incremental and non-monotonic meaning construc-
tion processes in the reader during discourse comprehension. In a GP joke, an initially
predominant interpretation gets violated. The incoherence on the level of the mental
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representation of the discourse has to be overcome by the retrieval of a second, hid-
den interpretation, which re-establishes a coherent representation. Previous accounts
on the phenomenon were adapted in a probabilistic way. The concept of probabilistic
salience was developed in order to highlight the strong relationships between stochastic
knowledge and the resolution of textual ambiguities. The probabilistic account has the
advantage to model di↵erent sources of knowledge (linguistic, pragmatic, contextual,
and world knowledge) in the same way, namely as conditional dependencies between
concepts. Bayesian belief networks are a useful computational model for tasks which re-
quire quick and reliable decisions, on the one hand, and flexible revision processes in the
light of new and unexpected evidence, on the other hand. An optimal balance of these
two cognitive mechanisms was assumed as an essential element of the human mind. GP
jokes seem to manifest these mechanisms on the level of communication processes. The
accessibility of knowledge in the memory, which can implement the new unexpected
evidence, was described as a highly complex (neuro-)cognitive function. Previous ac-
counts have labelled this search for a coherent interpretation after the failure of the
initial interpretation as frame-shifting. Despite agreeing with the basic claims of the
frame-shifting idea, it was argued that the cognitive mechanism underlying this task
might be much richer than it is implied by the concept of frames. Current models of the
human mind, however, seem still far away from being able to handle the multi-layered,
creative, associative, and multidimensional engagement of the cognitive representations
of the textual environment, as they are necessary for the comprehension of jokes and
verbal humor in general. Some of the ideas in this chapter are not new, but are cov-
ered within a di↵erent framework. Some new ideas for future directions in the field of
discourse comprehension and humor research were presented as well, and some of these
suggestions need further empirical tests.
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Chapter 3
From Incoherence to Mirth
3.1 Introduction
Contrary to so-called garden path sentences (Ferreira, Christianson, & Hollingworth,
2001; Osterhout & Holcomb, 1992), the violation and the re-analysis of GP jokes are
localized at the semantic rather than syntactic level. Here, the mental representation of
the discourse, theoretically depicted as mental model (Johnson-Laird, 1983) or situation
model (Kintsch, 1988, 1998), is violated at the PL. It is commonly assumed that the
discourse comprehension is an active process of cognitive construction that involves the
integration of explicit linguistic input with other linguistic and non-linguistic context
information, including new semantic and pragmatic inferences and knowledge from long-
term memory. Most importantly, a committed false belief concerning the interpretation
of the text has to be substituted. This “(belief) revision” of the semantic representation
(of SU) is the crucial mechanism during the comprehension of GP jokes (cf. Mayerhofer
& Schacht, 2013). Consider again example (1).
(1) “Mummy, I just turned 14 years. May I please, finally, be allowed to
wear a bra and make up?” -“No, and eat up your soup, my son.”
Given the linguistic information and the recipient’s world knowledge, the child being
a girl is the most plausible interpretation of the set-up phase. This interpretation
gets violated when one hears the mother calling the child “son” (PL), thus leading to
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incongruity. Belief revision occurs, and the recipient represents a boy who would love to
wear a bra and make up. This incongruity resolution, in combination with the activation
of the alternative, hidden interpretation and with its “inappropriateness” (Ritchie, 2004,
p.61), is typically accompanied by the experience of laughter and mirth in the recipient.
Many researchers agree upon the outlined sequential comprehension process, supported
by empirical evidence. Vaid et al. (2003) demonstrated priming e↵ects due to the dom-
inant semantic networks specifically activated at di↵erent stages of joke comprehension
over time. Coulson and Kutas (1998) found longer reading times for joke endings com-
pared to straight (coherent) endings. These longer reading times were also accompanied
by regressive eye movements after reading of the punch-line (Coulson et al., 2006).
Evidence for the enhanced costs of semantic revision also comes from non-joke texts
(Carreiras, 1996; Sturt, 2007).
Recently, several studies using event-related brain potentials (ERPs) have investigated
the processing of jokes and verbal humor. Three (groups of) ERP components were
especially fruitful for the study of verbal humor: the N400, late positivities, and the
left anterior negativity. The N400 component (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980) is an enhanced
negative-going deflection at cento-parietal electrodes starting around 200–250 ms after
stimulus onset and lasting until 500–550 ms after stimulus onset with a peak around
400 ms, hence the name. It reliably occurs with semantic violations during sentence
or discourse comprehension (Berkum, Hagoort, & Brown, 1999). Other important fac-
tors that influence the amplitude of the N400 component are the predictability of a
word in a given context, as for example reflected by the Cloze-probability (Kutas &
Hillyard, 1984), and the semantic relatedness between the context and the expected
word. The N400 e↵ect functionally reflects semantic integration di culties at the inter-
face of word/stimulus recognition, linguistic and nonlinguistic context, and conceptual
binding with the long-term-memory during an active comprehension process (Kutas &
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Federmeier, 2011). Previous ERP studies on joke comprehension have led to hetero-
geneous evidence regarding N400 e↵ects. Derks, Gillikin, Bartolome-Rull, and Bogart
(1997) found augmented N400 amplitudes for jokes that also elicited a higher activation
of the zygomatic muscle, indicating the elicitation of positive emotions. Coulson and
Kutas (2001) found an N400 e↵ect for joke endings involving frame shifting compared
to straight endings. The e↵ect was restricted to jokes with high semantic constraint on
the ending. This finding was replicated in follow-up studies, shown to be only present
for participants with a low verbal intelligence score (Coulson & Lovett, 2004), and to
be related to the visual field of the stimulus presentation (Coulson & Williams, 2005).
Several ERP studies on language comprehension demonstrated syntactic violations to
elicit an augmented positivity at posterior scalp sites. This so-called P600 component
usually starts around 600 ms after stimulus onset and lasts until around 1200 ms. Since
these late positivities are especially triggered by syntactic anomalies, such as in GP
sentences (Bever, 1970; Osterhout & Holcomb, 1992), they are commonly considered to
reflect syntactic repair processes which occur after the detection of a syntactic violation
for the initially dominant parsing. However, Van Herten et al. (2005) found posterior
P600 e↵ects for semantic anomalies, and experimentally ruled out the possibility of a
hidden syntactic anomaly being responsible for the component. This finding led the
authors to argue that the P600 is a form of monitoring component “that checks upon
the veridicality of one’s analysis” (Van Herten et al., 2005, p.254). In line with this
assumption, the P600 has been suggested to reflect a combinatorial process, integrating
both syntactic and semantic features of a sentence (e.g., Wicha, Moreno, & Kutas,
2004; Mart́ın-Loeches et al., 2009), and has also been reported for increased discourse
complexity (Burkhardt, 2007). Moreover, a late positivity e↵ect – distinguishable from
the typical P600 e↵ect by its frontal distribution – has been reported (Schacht et al.,
2010) and related to the complexity and the ambiguity of a text (Kaan & Swaab, 2003).
47
In many regards, GP jokes might be assumed as a semantic equivalent of GP sentences.
Thus, the question is whether a semantic repair process in jokes – such as the belief re-
vision – triggers similar brain response patterns as the mainly syntactic repair processes
(P600 at posterior sites). Previous evidence has partly indicated such similarity, but
remains incomplete (Coulson & Lovett, 2004; Marinkovic et al., 2011).
Apart from the P600 like findings, there is strong evidence that joke endings, triggering
believe-revision processes, elicit a left-lateralized sustained anterior negativity (Late
Left Anterior Negativity; LLAN), between 500 and 900 ms after stimulus onset. This
component has been shown only for good comprehenders (Coulson & Kutas, 2001;
Coulson & Williams, 2005) or restricted to left-handed participants (Coulson & Lovett,
2004). Coulson and co-workers suggested that the component reflects the successful
comprehension of jokes and called this e↵ect “frame-shifting component” according to
their terminology. The LLAN has also been considered to reflect working memory
activity necessary for the computation of a new mental representation of the discourse
(Baggio, Van Lambalgen, & Hagoort, 2008; Meltzer & Braun, 2013; Münte, Schiltz, &
Kutas, 1998).
GP jokes also reliably lead to the subjective experience of mirth. Therefore, one might
expect other ERP components elicited by jokes, reflecting the emotional processes.
Emotion-related ERP responses to humorous visual stimuli have been reported as Pos-
terior Positivities between 300 and 600 ms after the onset (Gierych, Milner, & Michalski,
2005; Korb, Grandjean, Samson, Delplanque, & Scherer, 2012). These components show
strong similarities to the late positive complex (LPC), which has repeatedly been shown
in response to emotional stimuli, such as a↵ective pictures (e.g., Cuthbert, Schupp,
Bradley, Birbaumer, & Lang, 2000; Schupp et al., 2000), and to facial emotional ex-
pressions and emotional words (e.g., Schacht & Sommer, 2009a, 2009b). This e↵ect has
been related to sustained, elaborative processing of emotional relevance of a given stim-
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ulus. At longer latencies, Du et al. (2013) reported an enhanced positivity to Chinese
jokes compared with neutral Chinese texts between 1250 and 1400 ms after the stimulus
onset, which the authors related to an a↵ective stage of the joke processing.
It is the main aim of the present study to disentangle di↵erent sub-processes or process-
ing stages, respectively, involved in the comprehension of GP jokes to be reflected in
distinguishable ERP components over time. At least, three di↵erent processing stages
are hypothesized to be involved: (a) the violation of the pre-dominant initial semantic
representation, (b) the revision of this semantic representation, and (c) the occurrence
of an emotional reaction. To this aim, we constructed parallel versions of selected jokes
in such a way that all comprehension processes should remain constant apart from the
processes of interest outlined above. This manipulation was realized by exchanging only
the final word of the original jokes as in the following examples (compared to (1)):
(2) “Mummy, I just turned 14 years. May I please, finally, be allowed to
wear a bra and make up?” -“No, and eat up your soup, my girl.”
(3) “Mummy, I just turned 14 years. May I please, finally, be allowed to
wear a bra and make up?” -“No, and eat up your soup, my father.”
In example (2), the interpretation of the whole discourse is straight-forward and co-
herent. Thus, no belief revision is necessary. In example (3), the initial interpretation
gets violated. The final sentence is a grammatically and semantically correct sentence,
but its final word is discourse incoherent, thus triggering revision processes. In contrast
to the joke ending of example (1), no hidden interpretation (or at least no plausible
one) can be activated and no alternative meaningful coherent representation of the text
can be constructed. This makes the whole text incomprehensible. The joke endings
share the discourse incoherence with (3) at the occurrence of the final word (PL), but
it shares the comprehensibility of a meaningful discourse with (2), once the belief re-
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vision has been successfully carried out. In a series of experiments, we investigated
the neuro-cognitive processes being specific for GP jokes, using 48 GP jokes and their
coherent and incoherent manipulations as stimuli. Experiment 1 focused on behavioral
measures using a self-paced reading time paradigm. Here, I expected increasing read-
ing times from coherent over incoherent to joke endings. In Experiment 2 to 4, ERPs
were of main interest in order to localize the GP-specific sub-processes. Hypotheses
were as follows: Joke endings and incoherent endings both represent the violation of the
initially dominant semantic representation and should thus elicit an augmented N400
component. Successful belief-revision processes in GP joke comprehension – requiring
enhanced inferential and working-memory related processes – should be reflected in the
occurrence of LLAN components. Only joke endings should elicit an emotional response.
Therefore, we expected emotion-related ERP components at subsequent, late stages of
joke processing, namely following the violation and the revision processes.
Another potentially fruitful indicator of both cognitive and emotional processes during
the comprehension of jokes could be provided by pupillary responses, which we also
measured in Experiment 2. First, changes of pupil size have been shown to be a sensi-
tive measure for the cognitive load during a task: Higher cognitive load leads to larger
pupil dilation (Kahneman & Beatty, 1966; Van Der Meer et al., 2010). Second, larger
pupil dilations have also been reported in association with higher emotional involve-
ment, related to the arousal (Bradley, Miccoli, Escrig, & Lang, 2008) or to the intensity
(Partala & Surakka, 2003) of an emotional reaction. Both factors cognitive load and
emotional processing have been shown to a↵ect pupil dilations also in the processing
of verbal stimuli, such as single word processing and recognition (Bayer et al., 2011;
Võ et al., 2008). Since the successful comprehension of GP jokes is hypothesized to in-
volve both increased cognitive processing e↵ort and an emotional response, we expected
larger pupil dilations after joke endings compared to coherent endings. Changes of pupil
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size to incoherent endings should be intermediate due to enhanced cognitive demands
(violation detection) on the one hand but the absence of both revision processes and
emotional response on the other hand.
3.2 Experiment 1: Reading Times
The comprehension process of GP jokes is considered to contain two important stages:
the detection of the violation of the semantic representation and the belief revision pro-
cess. Both factors should lead to enhanced cognitive load which should be reflected
in an increase of the reading times at the final word, the PL, compared to coherent
endings, as previously shown for English material (Coulson & Kutas, 1998). In the
present experiment, we expected similar results for our German stimuli. Moreover, we
were interested in di↵erences between the reading times of joke compared to incoherent
endings. This comparison aimed at investigating at which point of the discourse com-
prehension process readers realize whether it makes sense to search for a hidden coherent
interpretation. If participants understand at a very early stage after the onset of the
final word that there will not be a hidden joke interpretation, this should be reflected
by shorter reading times for the incoherent endings compared to the joke endings. This
would indicate that parallel to the violation of the semantic representation at the joke
ending readers get some sort of hinge that it makes sense to pursue a re-interpretation
and belief revision for the joke endings. This hinge should be absent for incoherent
endings. If this is not the case joke endings and incoherent endings should trigger the
same cognitive attempt to find a coherent meaning construction. Another question was,
how long a participant will search for a new coherence until she or he realizes that this
search is in vain in the case of an incoherent ending. Longer reading times for incoherent
endings compared to joke endings would thus indicate a very persistent willingness to
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re-establish a coherent interpretation for an incoherent text.
3.2.1 Method
Participants
Twenty-four participants (16 females), ranging in age between 18 and 29 years (M =
22.48, SD = 2.93), were tested. All of them were native speakers of German and
students at the University of Göttingen, coming from a wide range of disciplines. They
were rewarded with €8/h for their participation.
Material
A total number of 144 stimuli was constructed. Forty-eight jokes were selected from
di↵erent sources according to the following criteria: (i) They had to exploit the GP
mechanism. Additionally, they were selected to be (ii) ethically acceptable, (iii) sub-
jectively amusing, (iv) translatable into German, unless they were originally German,
without losing the amusement potential and without destroying the underlying GP
structure, and (v) rewritable in such a way that the very final word of the last sen-
tence could serve as the crucial PL element. Based on these 48 jokes, two additional
versions were constructed by exchanging only the final word of the text. In the Coher-
ent condition, the final word of the joke was replaced by a word which was coherent
according to the initial first interpretation of the text. In the Incoherent condition,
the final word was replaced by a word which is incoherent according to the first in-
terpretation and which does not o↵er a hidden interpretation of the set-up. Impor-
tantly, this final word violated neither the syntactic nor the semantic structure of the
last sentence but it did not fit into the whole discourse of the text. This led to a
total number of 144 stimuli with 48 text fragments identical in all three conditions
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Table 3.1: Descriptive data of the matched stimulus features.
Variable M SD
(a) Coherent
Number of Letters 8.17 2.9
Word Frequency 12.62 3.62
(b) Incoherent
Number of Letters 7.9 3.13
Word Frequency 12.35 3.95
(c) Joke
Number of Letters 7.81 2.94
Word Frequency 11.88 3.9
but varying final words between conditions. Final words were matched between con-
ditions according to Word Category, Word Frequency (Leipziger Worthäufigkeitsklasse;
http://wortschatz.informatik.uni-leipzig.de/), and Word Length (number of
letters). Descriptive statistics of the material is reported in Table 3.1.
In pre-experimental ratings, 68 participants (46 females) between 18 and 36 years
(M = 23.19, SD = 3.38) evaluated on 5-step scales from 1 (tri↵t überhaupt nicht zu/ do
not agree at all) to 5 (tri↵t völlig zu/ totally agree). Items were constructed according
to three theoretically derived dimensions: humorous potential (Humor), predictability
of the ending (Predictability), and comprehensibility of the whole text (Comprehen-
sibility). For each dimension, three items were constructed in order to obtain: (i) a
behavioral component, (ii) a cognitive appraisal, (iii) an emotional response (see Ap-
pendix A for all items). These three items per scale were summed together for the three
total scale scores. The results of the ratings are depicted in Figure 3.1.
ANOVAs and Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc t-tests were carried out for the three scales.
Only texts that were indicated as unfamiliar to the participants were included in the
analysis. There was a significant e↵ect of Condition on all three scales: Humor, F (2, 141) =
























































Figure 3.1: Box plot of the three scales of the ratings. Every data point is one observation
of one participant and one stimulus. The thick line is the median, the box represents
the 25% and 75% quantiles, and the whiskers are the minimum and maximum values,
while points represent statistical outliers.
F (2, 141) = 115.45, p < .001. The Joke condition (M = 8.83, SD = 1.04) was rated
as more humorous than both the Coherent (M = 5.39, SD = 1.42), t(94) = 14.52, p <
.001, and the Incoherent condition (M = 5.5, SD = 1.06), t(94) = 13.29, p < .001,
while there was no significant di↵erence between Coherent and Incoherent. The Joke
condition (M = 8.83, SD = 1.04) was rated less predictable than Coherent (M =
9.92, SD = 1.24), t(94) =  4.66, p < .001, but more predictable than Incoherent
(M = 7.07, SD = 1.11), t(94) = 8.04, p < .001. Thirdly, the Incoherent condi-
tion (M = 8.33, SD = 1.68) was rated less comprehensible than the Joke condition
(M = 12.25, SD = 1.12), t(94) =  13.41, p < .001, and than the Coherent condition
(M = 11.89, SD = 1.32), t(94) =  11.51, p < .001, while there was no significant di↵er-
54
ence between Joke and Coherent. Ratings confirmed the validity and the suitability of
the stimulus material. The 144 stimuli (48 Joke, 48 Coherent, 48 Incoherent) were used
for Experiment 1. In addition, 144 Filler items were constructed as similar as possible
to the original stimuli in terms of the linguistic style, e.g., syntactic structure, topic,
lexical level, dialogs, etc. Similar to the experimental stimuli, identical 48 text frag-
ments were completed with three di↵erent endings: two di↵erent coherent endings and
a discourse-incoherent ending. The filler items fulfilled the following functions: (i) They
diluted the proportion of jokes, supposed to make the purpose of the study less obvious.
(ii) They reduced the proportion of repetitions of the text fragments and, should, there-
fore, distract the participants from keeping all the text fragments in memory. Note that
responses to fillers were not analyzed. The total of 288 texts was distributed to three
di↵erent sets (every set containing 96 di↵erent text fragments). The order of the texts
within a set was randomized for every participant and the six possible permutations of
the block order were equally distributed over all the participants, resulting in 288 short
texts of six conditions (Joke, Coherent, Incoherent, Filler 1, Filler 2, Filler Incoherent)
for each participant. This guaranteed that possible influences by the repetition of the
text fragments were at least equally balanced across the participants and the conditions.
Procedure
The experiment was carried out in a group lab on a computer with four participants per
session. After they had indicated the demographic data, participants received instruc-
tions on the computer screen that they participated in an experiment on text compre-
hension. They were made familiar with the presentation of the stimuli and were told to
carefully read the texts. They were explicitly told that some of the texts were hard to
understand, and that some of them did not make sense at all. Also, they were explicitly
instructed to continue with the next stimulus when they think that they understood
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the text or when they are sure that the text does not make sense.
The texts were presented on a computer screen with an adapted version of the Moving
Windows Paradigm (Just, Carpenter, & Woolley, 1982), implemented by Pygame, a
graphical interface for Python. In a first step, the whole text was presented to the
participant with the final sentence of the text being masked by blanks. The last sentence
of the text appeared word by word after the participants pressed the return key on a
standard keyboard. Only the actual word appeared unmasked, and the words that had
been read became masked again. Most importantly, the reading time for the final word
(the crucial manipulation of the experiment) was measured as the time between the
onset of the final word and the moment a participant pressed the return key on the
keyboard in order to proceed with the next text.
After a pseudo-randomly chosen amount of trials (normal distribution withM = 10, SD =
4), participants were presented with a statement concerning the previously presented
text and had to indicate whether the statement was true in relationship to the currently
read text. The comprehension question was randomly chosen to aim for a correct “true”
or a correct“false”answer. The comprehension task had the main function of preventing
participants from clicking themselves through the task without proper processing of the
stimuli.
Results
Responses below 200 ms and above 3 standard deviations above participant’s aver-
age were excluded from the analysis. Every participant’s mean reading times of the
final word per condition (Incoherent, Joke, and Coherent) were calculated and log-
transformed. A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant main e↵ect of condition, F (2, 46) =
8.51, p < .001, ⌘2G = .27, with significantly shorter reading times for coherent (M =
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1018, SD = 329) as compared to joke endings (M = 1162, SD = 446) , t(23) =
 3.97, p < .001, d =  1.29, and to incoherent endings (M = 1111, SD = 403), t(23) =
 2.62, p = .015, d =  .91. The latter did not di↵er significantly, t(23) = 1.49, p =
.149, d =  .43.
3.2.2 Discussion
The hypothesis of longer reading times for joke endings compared to coherent endings
was clearly supported by the data. Further, the reading times of the joke endings tended
to be prolonged in comparison to incoherent endings, but this di↵erence failed signif-
icance. Reading of incoherent endings took also significantly longer than of coherent
endings. Together, these findings indicated that either the detection of the semantic
incoherence itself is characterized by higher processing demands or the participants
started the same attempt of finding an alternative interpretation as in the joke endings,
possibly, triggered by the occurrence of jokes during the experiment.
3.3 Experiment 2: Evidence from ERPs and changes
of pupil size
Reading times, as measured in Experiment 1, reflect only the sum of several sub-
processes, thus not allowing any specific assumptions regarding specific processing stages.
ERPs provide the advantage of high temporal resolution in the range of milliseconds.
Therefore, distinguishable ERP components can be related more precisely to the hypoth-
esized underlying cognitive or emotional processing stages involved. Here, we recorded
ERPs and the changes of the pupil size in relation to the di↵erent endings of the stimulus





Twenty-five students from di↵erent disciplines participated in this experiment. All of
them were native speakers of German. From this sample, data of four participants had
to be removed from analysis because they were familiar with too many of the jokes
(N = 2) or because of excessive number of EEG artifacts (N = 2). The remaining
21 participants (14 females) were between 20 and 34 years old (M = 24.2, SD = 3.82)
and had an LQ score between -90 and 100 (M = 60.4, SD = 57.34), according to the
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). All reported normal or corrected-
to-normal vision and no neurological or neuropsychological disorders. Participants gave
their informed consent and received €20 or course credit. None of them had participated
in the rating experiment or in Experiment 1.
Material
Exactly the same stimulus material was used as in Experiment 1.
Procedure
Participants were seated in a dimly illuminated, sound-attenuated, and electrically
shielded chamber, facing a monitor at a distance of 60 cm. They were made famil-
iar with the presentation of the stimuli and were instructed to carefully read the texts.
They were explicitly told that some of the texts are hard to understand and that some
of them do not make sense at all.
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The texts were presented on the computer screen with an adapted version of an RSVP
(rapid serial visual presentation) paradigm, implemented by Pygame in black on light-
yellow background. Each trial consisted of the following sequence: The text fragment
(without the final sentence) was presented at the center of the screen. After a but-
ton press, the final sentences began with a fixation cross of 500 ms duration and was
presented word-by-word, with 250 ms duration per word and 500 ms SOA. After the
critical final word disappeared, another fixation cross was presented for 5000 ms, which
was followed by a comprehension task. A statement concerning the preceding text was
presented and participants were asked to indicate whether the statement is correct or
not by pressing one of two buttons. The questions were pseudo-randomly chosen to
be either correctly accepted or declined. Afterwards, participants had to indicate on a
questionnaire which of the jokes they were sure that they had been familiar with prior
the experiment.
Psychophysiological recordings, processing, and analysis
ERPs were recorded from 68 active Ag/AgCl electrodes located according to the ex-
tended 10-20 system (Pivik et al., 1993). Sixty-four electrodes were placed in an elec-
trode cap. External electrodes were used for the vertical and horizontal electrooculo-
gram (left eye) and left and right mastoid. EEG signals were amplified by a Biosemi
ActiveTwo AD-box, referenced to the common mode sense (CMS; active electrode) and
grounded to the driven right leg (DRL; passive electrode). All channels were recorded
with a passband of 0.16–100 Hz; sampling rate was 512 Hz. O✏ine, the continuous EEG
record was converted to average reference, corrected for blinks using Surrogate Multiple
Source Eye Correction (MSEC; Ille, Berg, & Scherg, 2002) as implemented in BESA
(Brain Electric Source Analysis, MEGIS Software GmbH) and filtered with a 30 Hz
low-pass filter. Continuous EEG data were segmented into epochs of 1200 ms, starting
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200 ms before the onset of the critical (final) word. All ERPs were referred to a 200 ms
pre-stimulus baseline. Epochs containing artifacts were automatically discarded when
any amplitude exceeded -100 or +100 µV or when any voltage step exceeded 50 µV
per sampling point in any of the channels. Data of two participants were dropped from
analyses (less than 50 % of the trials remained). For all remaining participants, be-
tween 61 % and 100 % of the trials (M = 89.94, SD = 10.82) entered the analysis, with
the additional criteria of correct responses to comprehension questions and indicated
unfamiliarity of jokes. In total, 20 to 37 (M = 29.1, SD = 5.8) trials per participant,
electrode, and experimental condition were averaged. All ERPs were referred to a 200
ms pre-stimulus baseline.
Based on the literature and on visual inspection of the data, mean ERP amplitudes
were calculated in the three following time windows after stimulus onset: 250–500 ms
(N400), 500–700 ms (LLAN), and 700–1000 ms (late posterior positivities) and submit-
ted to repeated measures overall ANOVAs including the factors Condition (Coherent,
Incoherent, Joke) and Electrode (66). By definition, the average reference sets the
mean value of the ERP amplitude to zero across all electrodes within a given condition.
Therefore, for these ANOVAs, only e↵ects in interaction with electrodes are meaningful.
In addition to analyses including all electrodes, e↵ects were assessed by ANOVAs on
ERPs on relevant electrode groups defined by visual inspection of di↵erence maps
(region-of-interest analysis, ROI). Between 250 and 500 ms (N400), ERP amplitudes
were assessed at a group of central electrodes (FC1, FCz, FC2, C1, Cz, C2, CP1, CPz,
CP2). ERPs in the subsequent time window (500 to 700 ms, LLAN) were assessed at
left anterior electrodes (AF7, AF3, F7, F5, FT7, FC5, T7, FP1); between 700 and 1000
ms (late positivities), ERP amplitudes were quantified at a group of frontal electrodes
(FP2, AF8, F8, F6, F4, AF4, Fz, F2, F1, AFz, FPz). These ROI analyses included the
factors Electrode (9, 8, or 11, respectively) and Condition (3).
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In all analyses, Huynh-Feldt correction was applied to adjust the degrees of freedom
of the F-ratios. Please note that all within-subject repeated ANOVA measures will be
reported with uncorrected degrees of freedom but Huynh-Feldt corrected p-values. In
all cases, for post-hoc pair-wise comparisons alpha levels were Bonferroni-corrected.
Pupil sizes were continuously tracked with a Desktop Mount Eye-tracking System,
EYELINK 2000 by SR Research. The method was elliptic tracking of the dominant
eye at a 50 % illumination rate and a 1000 Hz sampling rate. The head position was
stabilized with a chin and a forehead rest. Each block of the experiment was started
with a 9-point-calibration and validation phase of the eye tracking. O✏ine, continuous
data were segmented into epochs of 3200 ms, starting 200 ms before the onset of the final
word; segments were referred to the 200 ms pre-stimulus interval. Incorrectly answered
trials and trials with jokes that were familiar to the participants before the experiment
were removed. Trials with blinks were removed; the missing data were interpolated
with the preceding and following 50 samples. ANOVAs with Condition as a within-
factor (three levels) were conducted on averaged data in consecutive 50 ms segments
in order to detect the onsets of significant di↵erences. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc
t-tests for paired samples were further applied in case of significant main e↵ects. The
data from participants excluded from ERP analysis did not enter these analyses.
3.3.2 Results
Behavioral Data
The test scores (together with the demographic data) are presented in Table 3.2. ANOVA
on Comprehension scores showed a significant e↵ect of Condition, F (2, 40) = 29.58, p <
.001, ⌘2p = .59, with significantly more correctly answered trials in the Coherent than
in both the Joke, t(20) = 6.59, p < .001, d =  1.52, and in the Incoherent condition,
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Table 3.2: Descriptive data of the behavioral variables in Experiment 2 (N = 21)
Variable M SD
Comprehension Total 85.52 3.33
Comprehension Coherent 88.59 3.99
Comprehension Incoherent 77.78 5.94
Comprehension Joke 76.19 8.03
Number of Familiar Jokes 7.9 6.38
t(20) = 8.13, p < .001, d =  1.8. There was no di↵erence in the comprehension accuracy
between the Joke and the Incoherent condition, t(20) =  0.82, p = .430, d =  .17.
Electrophysiological Data
N400 N400. As can be seen in Figure 3.2 (first panel), an enhanced negativity over
the vertex occurred, showing the typical distribution of the N400 component. The over-
all ANOVA of mean ERP amplitudes between 250 and 500 ms revealed a significant
Condition by Electrode interaction, F (130, 2600) = 3.71, p < .001, ✏ = .144, ⌘2p = .156,
reflecting larger N400 amplitudes for incoherent, F (65, 1300) = 5.93, p < .001, ✏ =
.144, ⌘2p = .229, and joke endings, F (65, 1300) = 2.46, p = .004, ✏ = .191, ⌘
2
p = .109,
compared to coherent endings. Further, incoherent endings elicited larger amplitudes
compared with joke endings, F (65, 1300) = 2.55, p = .002, ✏ = .217, ⌘2p = .113. Results
of overall ANOVAs were verified by the ROI analysis showing a significant main e↵ect
of Condition, F (2, 40) = 15.58, p < .001, ✏ = 1, ⌘2p = .438, but no significant interaction
between Condition and Electrode, F (16, 320) = 1.25, p = .256, ✏ = .641, ⌘2p = .059.
Again, post-hoc comparisons revealed significant di↵erences between all three condi-
tions: Joke vs. Coherent, F (1, 20) = 16.7, p = .001, ✏ = 1, ⌘2p = .455, Incoherent
vs. Coherent, F (1, 20) = 19.79, p < .001, ✏ = 1, ⌘2p = .497, Incoherent vs. Joke,
F (1, 20) = 8.17, p = .010, ✏ = 1, ⌘2p = .290.
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LLAN/sustained N400 In the following interval from 500 to 700 ms, the overall
ANOVA of mean ERP amplitudes revealed a significant interaction between Condition
and Electrode, F (130, 2600) = 2.56, p < .001, ✏ = .169, ⌘2p = .114. Post-hoc compar-
isons revealed significant di↵erences between Incoherent and Coherent, F (65, 1300) =
3.12, p < .001, ✏ = .200, ⌘2p = .135, and between Incoherent and Joke, F (65, 1300) =
3.13, p = .001, ✏ = .169, ⌘2p = .135, whereas the conditions Joke and Coherent did not
statistically di↵er, F (65, 1300) = 1.
The ROI analysis of LLAN electrodes showed a significant main e↵ect of Condition,
F (2, 40) = 8.76, p = .001, ✏ = 1, ⌘2p = .305, and no significant interaction between Con-
dition and Electrode, F (14, 280) = 1.33, p = .263, ✏ = .312, ⌘2p = .062, reflecting larger
amplitudes to incoherent compared to both coherent, F (1, 20) = 12.19, p = .002, ✏ =
1, ⌘2p = .379, and joke endings, F (1, 20) = 11.61, p = .003, ✏ = 1, ⌘
2
p = .367, while ERPs
to coherent and joke endings did not di↵er from each other, F (1, 20) < 1.
However, as can be seen in the depicted maps of ERP di↵erences of Figure 2, incoherent
endings and also joke endings – even though to a smaller extent – elicited an N400-
like component rather than a LLAN modulation within this interval. Therefore, we
carried out an additional ROI analysis, selecting a group of central electrodes (FC1,
FCz, FC2, C1, Cz, C2, CP1, CPz, CP2), resembling the maximum of this sustained
N400 e↵ect. This analysis revealed a significant main e↵ect of Condition, F (2, 40) =
8.04, p = .002, ✏ = 1, ⌘2p = .287, and a significant Condition by Electrode interaction,
F (16, 320) = 1.97, p = .036, ✏ = .651, ⌘2p = .09, indicating slight topographical shifts
between conditions. Both incoherent and joke endings elicited larger negativities in
comparison to coherent endings, F (1, 20) = 12.99, p = .002, ✏ = 1, ⌘2p = .394, and,
F (1, 20) = 7.91, p = .011, ✏ = 1, ⌘2p = .283, respectively, whereas no significant di↵erence
occurred between ERPs elicited by incoherent compared to joke endings, F (1, 20) =
3.24, p = .087, ✏ = 1, ⌘2p = .140.
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Late Positivities The overall ANOVA of mean ERP amplitudes between 700 and
1000 ms revealed a significant interaction between Condition and Electrode, F (130, 2600) =
2.27, p = .001, ✏ = .17, ⌘2p = .102, reflecting enhanced anterior positivities (see Figure 2)
to joke endings in comparison to both coherent, F (65, 1300) = 3.06, p < .001, ✏ =
.228, ⌘2p = .133, and incoherent endings, F (65, 1300) = 2.17, p = .006, ✏ = .246, ⌘
2
p =
.098, whereas no significant di↵erence between ERPs to incoherent versus coherent end-
ings occurred, F (65, 1300) = 1.77, p = .051, ✏ = .191, ⌘2p = .081.
As in the overall ANOVA, analyses of mean ERPs at selected anterior electrodes revealed
a significant main e↵ect of Condition, F (2, 40) = 9.06, p = .001, ✏ = 1, ⌘2p = .312, but
no significant Condition by Electrode interaction, F (20, 400) = 1. Again, in post-hoc
comparisons significant ERP di↵erences between joke and coherent endings, F (1, 20) =
16.71, p = .001, ✏ = 1, ⌘2p = .455, and joke and incoherent endings, F (1, 20) = 12.78, p =
.002, ✏ = 1, ⌘2p = .390, have been found, whereas ERPs to coherent and incoherent
endings not significantly di↵ered, F (1, 20) = 0.
Pupil Size data
The ANOVAs on mean pupil sizes in consecutive 50 ms time windows, including the
factor Condition, revealed significant di↵erences between 800 and 3000 ms, Fs(2, 40) =
4.304 to 30.15, ps < .05 to < .001, ⌘2p = .16 to .6. Bonferroni-corrected t-tests indicated
significantly larger pupil sizes in response to Joke compared to Incoherent and Coherent
after 850 ms. This e↵ect lasted until the end of the segmentation, ts(23) = 2.57 to
6.27, ps < .05 to < .001, ds = .52 to 1.36. Further, Coherent elicited significantly larger
pupil sizes than Incoherent, starting at 2000 ms lasting until the end of the segmentation,
ts(23) =  2.55 to 3.03, ps < .05, ds=  .52 to  .65 (see Figure 3.3).
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Figure 3.2: Di↵erence maps of the conditions for the three time windows and grand
average waves for selected electrodes as a function of Time relative to the stimulus
onset and Condition in Experiment 2.
3.3.3 Discussion
As hypothesized and in line with previous findings (Coulson & Kutas, 2001; Derks et
al., 1997), joke endings elicited more negative ERP amplitudes at central and centro-
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Figure 3.3: The grand average waves of the changes in pupil area (arbitrary unit) as a
function of Time relative to the stimulus onset and Condition. The grey box indicates
the time window with significant main e↵ects of the running ANOVA for every 50 ms.
The arrows indicate the time windows with Bonferroni-corrected significant Post-hoc
comparisons.
after the onset of the final word (PL). Compared to Incoherent, this N400 e↵ect was
reduced in the Joke condition. The N400 component is a reliable measurement for the
degree of expectation violation and, even more important, for the degree of semantic
integration di culties. Therefore, the N400 e↵ect here paralleled the predictability
ratings of Experiment 1. The finding of reduced N400 e↵ects to joke as compared
to incoherent endings suggested a weaker incoherence and, probably, the activation
of a possible alternative hidden joke interpretation. This activation might initiate a
spreading activation toward new relevant semantic content for rapidly integrating the
joke endings into the context. In contrast, for completely incoherent endings, such an
activation and integration of a possible alternative interpretation might not occur.
In the time window of the hypothesized LLAN, i.e. 500 to 700 ms after the onset of
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the PL, no evidence for a LLAN component for joke endings was found. The LLAN
component had been hypothesized to reflect increased working memory load necessary
for the re-establishment of a coherent discourse or successful “frame-shifting” (Coulson
& Kutas, 2001; Coulson & Lovett, 2004). Instead, we mainly found a sustained N400
e↵ect for incoherent and – even though somewhat weaker – joke endings during this time
interval. A possible reason for this contradictory finding might be the mere presence
of incoherent endings. Incoherent endings might have been such a strong contrast that
the perception of the di↵erence between joke and coherent endings was strongly dimin-
ished. In addition, one might argue that the repetition of the text-fragments triggered
the search for hidden joke interpretations also for incoherent endings. Accordingly, the
LLAN might have been drastically reduced compared to previous studies (Coulson &
Kutas, 2001; Coulson & Lovett, 2004). We directly tested for this possibility in Exper-
iment 3.
In the time window of Late Positivity components (700 to 1000 ms), joke endings elicited
a frontal positivity compared to both coherent and incoherent endings. Importantly,
the anterior locus of this ERP e↵ect clearly di↵ered from the typical posterior scalp
distribution of a P600. Our finding of such late positivity with an anterior rather
than posterior maximum parallels a previous report by Coulson and Lovett (2004) for
right-handed women during joke comprehension. The authors related this finding to less
hemispheric lateralization in women than in men. Even though participants’ handedness
and sex were not equally balanced in the present study, the present sample consisted for a
big part of right-handed women. Thus, it cannot be excluded that a more heterogeneous
sample would have led to a more posterior positivity.
Alternatively, it seems plausible that this frontal late positivity reflected emotional pro-
cesses during joke comprehension, corresponding to the findings by Du et al. (2013).
Accordingly, the frontal late positivity found here might be related to an “elabora-
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tion” stage of the joke comprehension (Wyer & Collins, 1992), including emotional
sub-processes towards the humorous stimuli, presumably generated in the vmPFC, bi-
lateral amygdalae, and bilateral parahippocampal gyri (see Chan, Chou, Chen, & Liang,
2012). Such interpretation is supported by our data from pupillometric recordings in
two aspects. First, pupil diameters after the PL word started to dissociate between
conditions around 850 ms, thus covering the latency of the frontal late positivity in the
Joke condition. Second and most importantly, pupil data parallel ERP findings: In
both parameters, joke endings di↵ered from both coherent and incoherent endings with
larger pupil dilations and larger ERP amplitudes. Interestingly, pupil sizes for incoher-
ent endings did initially not significantly di↵er from those to coherent endings. Starting
later in time (around 2000 ms), however, pupil dilations were diminished after inco-
herent compared to coherent endings. This finding suggested either a lack of cognitive
processing e↵ort or of emotional responses or even both in the Incoherent condition.
Together, two unexpected findings in our ERP data needed further clarification – the
lack of LLAN e↵ects to joke endings and of late positivities expected to occur after in-
coherent endings. Both insignificances might be due to contextual e↵ects caused by the
experimental setting, as we have discussed above. In order to control for such potential
context e↵ects on the ERP e↵ects obtained here, we conducted two additional experi-
ments in which either the joke or the incoherent condition were contrasted to coherent
processing separately. Therefore, we omitted the Incoherent condition in Experiment 3
and the Joke condition in Experiment 4.
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3.4 Experiment 3: ERP Comparison between Joke
and Coherent
The results regarding joke endings from Experiment 2 needed further exploration for
several reasons. First, the previously reported enhanced LLAN to joke endings compared
to coherent endings could not be replicated. Second, it could not be excluded that the
mere presence of the incoherent endings a↵ected the way participants processed the
joke endings in a severe manner. In order to address these two points, Experiment 3
was carried out as a closer replication of a study by Coulson and Kutas (2001). Here,
participants only received joke and coherent endings of the same text fragments. In
addition, only right-handed participants were tested, and the distribution of male and
female participants was equally balanced. We expected the following ERP e↵ects: In
comparison to coherent endings, joke endings should elicit enhanced amplitudes of the
N400 and late positivities. If a mere presence of incoherent endings was responsible for
the lack of a previously reported LLAN component, the LLAN should be elicited by




Twenty-four students (12 females, 12 males) from di↵erent disciplines between 19 and
28 years (M = 23.42, SD = 2.36) participated in this experiment. All of them were
native speakers of German. They were all right-handed (Oldfield, 1971). All reported
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no neurological or neuropsychological disor-
ders. Participants gave their informed consent and received €15 or course credit. None
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of them had participated in one of the previously described experiments.
Material and Procedure
Exactly the same stimulus material was used as in Experiment 2, but the Incoherent
stimuli and the Incoherent filler items were excluded, resulting in three blocks with 64
trials each. Stimulus presentation followed procedures of Experiment 2.
EEG recording and analysis
Recording and pre-processing of the ERP data, including elimination of trials, artifact
rejection and definition of ERP components (time windows and ROI electrodes), fol-
lowed the same procedure as that in Experiment 2. For all participants, between 59 %
and 89 % of the trials (M = 70.7, SD = 14.18) remained for the analysis. ANOVAs
on mean ERP amplitudes included the factors Electrode (9, 8, or 11, respectively) and
Condition (2 levels – Joke, Coherent).
3.4.2 Results
Behavioral data
Test scores and demographic data are presented in Table 3.3. A paired samples t-test
on Comprehension scores showed a significant e↵ect of Condition, t(23) =  6.11, p <
.001, d = 1.13, indicating worse comprehension of jokes in comparison to coherent stim-
uli.
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Table 3.3: Descriptive data of the behavioral variables in Experiment 3 (N = 24)
Variable M SD
Comprehension Total 88.35 4.55
Comprehension Coherent 89.76 5.79
Comprehension Joke 80.64 8.37
Number of Familiar Jokes 6.71 5.93
ERP data
N400 (250–500 ms) The ANOVA of ERPs of the ROI, defined at central electrodes,
revealed a significant main e↵ect of Condition, F (1, 23) = 8.60, p = .007, ✏ = 1, ⌘2p =
.272, and no significant interaction between Electrode and Condition, F (8, 184) = 1.
LLAN (500–700 ms) The ANOVA for the ROI at left-anterior electrodes showed no
significant main e↵ect of Condition, F (1, 23) = 1.71, p = .204, ✏ = 1, ⌘2p = .069, and no
significant interaction between Electrode and Condition, F (7, 161) < 1. Since we found
a sustained N400 e↵ect for the Joke condition in Experiment 2, we tested for such e↵ect
by conducting an ANOVA of ERPs including central electrodes (as in Experiment 2).
This analysis did neither reveal a significant main e↵ect of Condition, F (1, 23) < 1, nor
a significant Condition by Electrode interaction, F (8, 184) = 1.
Visual inspection of the data, however, indicated a peak of negative amplitudes for joke
endings that was restricted to a few left-anterior electrodes and limited to the time
window between 580 and 620 ms after the stimulus onset (see Figure 3.5). An ANOVA
of mean ERPs at these selected anterior electrodes (F7, F5, FT7, and AF7) revealed
an e↵ect of Condition, F (1, 23) = 4.89, p = .037, ✏ = 1, ⌘2p = .176, but no significant
Condition by Electrode interaction, F (3, 69) < 1. This LLAN amplitude (aggregated
over Condition and Electrode) was additionally significantly negatively correlated with
participants’ Total Comprehension score, r(23) =  .58, p = .003 (see Figure 3.4).
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Figure 3.4: Scatterplot of the mean amplitude in the LLAN time window and its ROI
and the total comprehension accuracy per participant split up for each condition in
Experiment 3. Regression lines indicate the significantly negative linear relationship
between these two variables.
Late Positivities (700–1000 ms) The ANOVA for anterior ROI electrodes revealed
neither a significant main e↵ect of Condition, F (1, 23) = 1.99, p = .172, ✏ = 1, ⌘2p = .080,
nor a significant interaction between Electrode and Condition, F (8, 184) < 1.
3.4.3 Discussion
First of all, it is striking that the e↵ects obtained in Experiment 3 were – in general
– much weaker than the e↵ects in Experiment 2, even though the same stimuli and
the same procedure had been used. There were two di↵erences between these two ex-
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Figure 3.5: Di↵erence maps of the conditions for the three time windows and grand
average waves for selected electrodes as a function of Time relative to the stimulus
onset and Condition in Experiment 3.
periments: (i) the absence of the Incoherent condition and the Incoherent fillers and
(ii) a slightly di↵erent sample of participants (right-handed and equally balanced be-
tween males and females). However, neither visual inspection nor statistical tests of
the data revealed sex-related di↵erences. The first modification reduced the duration of
the experimental session and might have also made the design of the experiment more
obvious.
The only robust e↵ect in Experiment 3 was the N400 e↵ect at centro-parietal electrode
sites. Overall, it was weaker than in Experiment 3. Since there were no incoherent
endings, participants might have found it easier to semantically integrate the joke end-
ing which led to less comprehension di culties. Visual inspection of the data revealed
similar activation patterns in the following time windows compared to Experiment 2
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and to the literature (left anterior negativity and late frontal positivity). Statistical
analysis, however, showed no convincing evidence for a negativity for the Joke condition
at left-anterior electrode sites between 500 and 700 ms (LLAN e↵ect), nor for the frontal
positivity between 700 and 1000 ms. We did find a left anterior negativity between 580
and 620 ms after stimulus onset that was similar to the a priori expected component.
Additionally, amplitudes of this component were related to participants’ total compre-
hension ability. Nevertheless, the reliability of this finding is highly questionable due to
possible inflations of the type 1 error by the post-hoc selection of the time window and
the electrodes.
3.5 Experiment 4: ERP Comparison between Inco-
herent and Coherent
In Experiment 2, incoherent endings as compared to coherent endings elicited larger and
long-lasting N400 e↵ects as hypothesized but failed to evoke any late positivity. The
data, however, showed a tendency for a left anterior late positivity which was almost
significant. The comparison between the Incoherent and Coherent condition might have
been a↵ected by the presence of the joke endings. The N400 e↵ect was as predicted,
but the left anterior positivity between 700 and 1000 ms after the stimulus onset was
puzzling. This positivity was clearly di↵erent from a typical P600 e↵ect. Two explana-
tions for this frontal positivity in Experiment 2 seemed reasonable. On the one hand, it
could be the case that the context of the humorous stimuli in Experiment 2 has severely
altered the processing of incoherent endings. It might have caused participants to en-
gage in the vain e↵ort of searching a coherent interpretation for a nonsensical discourse.
Such unsuccessful attempts are plausible if participants could not be completely sure
that the incoherent endings were really incoherent or just joke endings that were very
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hard to grasp. On the other hand, this component might have reflected the confusion
after an incoherent discourse. Experiment 3 aimed to shed light on this question by
removing all the joke endings, and also the incoherent filler endings.
3.5.1 Method
Participants
Twenty-four students (12 females, 12 males) of di↵erent disciplines between 19 and 29
years (M = 22.79, SD = 2.43) participated in this experiment. All of them were native
speakers of German and right-handed (according to Oldfield, 1971). All reported nor-
mal or corrected-to-normal vision and no neurological or neuropsychological disorders.
Participants gave their informed consent and received €15 or course credit. None of
them had participated in one of the previously described experiments.
Material
Exactly the same stimulus material was used as in Experiment 2, but the Joke stimuli
and the Incoherent filler items were excluded (three blocks with 64 trials per block).
Procedure
was exactly the same as in Experiment 2.
EEG recording and analysis
Recording and pre-processing of the ERP data followed Experiment 2. None of the data
had to be removed from subsequent analyses. Between 58 % and 100 % of the trials
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Table 3.4: Descriptive data of the behavioral variables in Experiment 4 (N = 24)
Variable M SD
Comprehension Total 87.92 4.74
Comprehension Coherent 89.65 4.91
Comprehension Incoherent 78.15 8.91
(M = 94.36, SD = 8.7) remained after artifact rejection. ERP components of interest
(N400, sustained N400, and late positivities), respective time windows (250–500 ms,
500–700 ms, and 700–1000 ms) as well as selected ROI electrodes for N400 e↵ects were
identical to Experiment 2. Since we expected typical P600 e↵ects for incoherent endings
under the given experimental conditions, we additionally assessed ERP activity from a
group of posterior electrodes (Iz, Oz, P1, Pz, P2, P9, P7, P5, P3, PO3, PO7, O1, P10,
P8, P6, P4, PO4, PO8, O2). ANOVAs on mean ERP amplitudes included the factors
Electrodes (9, 9, or 19, respectively) and Condition (2 levels – Incoherent, Coherent).
3.5.2 Results
Behavioral data
The test scores are presented in Table 3.4. A paired samples t-test with Condition as a
within factor and Comprehension score as the dependent variable showed a significant
e↵ect of Condition, , t(23) =  7.5, p < .001, d =  1.13. The comprehension score of
Incoherent was significantly lower than the score of Coherent.
ERP data
N400 (250–500 ms) The ROI ANOVA revealed a significant main e↵ect of Condi-
tion, F (1, 23) = 56.94, p < .001, ✏ = 1, ⌘2p = .712, and a weaker but significant interac-
tion between Electrode and Condition, F (8, 184) = 2.46, p = .049, ✏ = .51, ⌘2p = 097. As
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can be seen in Figure 3.6, incoherent endings elicited enhanced N400 amplitudes over
central electrodes, similar to Experiment 2.
Sustained N400 (500–700 ms) The ROI ANOVA showed a significant main e↵ect
of Condition, F (1, 23) = 19.54, p < .001, ✏ = 1, ⌘2p = .459, but no significant interaction
between Electrode and Condition, F (8, 184) < 1. Similar to Experiment 2, an enhanced
N400 occurred within this time window (see Figure 3.6).
Late positivities (700–1000 ms) The ROI ANOVA for the posterior electrode clus-
ter revealed a significant main e↵ect of Condition, F (1, 23) = 9.27, p = .006, ✏ = 1, ⌘2p =
.287, but no significant interaction between Electrode and Condition, F (18, 414) =
1.19, p = .304, ✏ = .426, ⌘2p = .050.
3.5.3 Discussion
In line with our hypotheses, the main findings of this control experiment consist of a
long-lasting N400 and an enhanced late positivity to incoherent as compared to coherent
endings. Whereas the N400 e↵ects show high similarity to those obtained in Experi-
ment 2, indicating their independence from experimental context, the late positivity
clearly di↵ers between both experiments. Whereas in Experiment 2, incoherent end-
ings failed to elicit a significant late positivity, as became evident from both the overall
and the ROI ANOVA, enhanced positivities occurred over posterior electrode sites in
response to incoherent endings. Possibly, this change is related to the fact that no joke
endings were present in the current setting. Therefore, participants realized very early
that it does not make sense to attempt to find a new interpretation.
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Figure 3.6: Di↵erence maps of the conditions for the three time windows and grand
average waves for selected electrodes as a function of Time relative to the stimulus
onset and Condition in Experiment 4.
3.6 General Discussion
GP jokes were described as a semantic-pragmatic phenomenon. They exploit a mislead-
ing discourse comprehension mechanism in order to amuse the recipient. The mental
representation of the discourse based on the initially dominant interpretation is violated
at the punch-line. Through a spreading activation of relevant semantic networks an
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alternative interpretation of the discourse is re-established. This re-interpretation and
semantic re-analysis is called belief revision in the present account in order to highlight
its close relationship to probabilistic (conditional) human reasoning and non-monotonic
logic (Mayerhofer & Schacht, 2013). A successful belief revision in combination with
the humorous content of the hidden interpretation is emotionally rewarded with mirth.
Four empirical studies (reading time, three ERP studies, and pupil size data) supported
the hypothesized neuro-cognitive processes when compared to coherent texts on the one
hand and to (discourse-)incoherent texts on the other hand: violation of the semantic
representation, revision of the semantic representation and emotional reaction.
The GP joke endings di↵ered compared to the same texts with a coherent ending.
They were harder to grasp, were rated as less predictable, triggered increased reading
times for the final word due to the detection of the semantic violation and due to the
belief revision of the semantic mental representation. Further, the joke endings elicited
the well-established N400 e↵ect in the ERP data reflecting some (minor) di culties at
the stage of the semantic integration. This e↵ect provides evidence for an automatic
default interpretation of the ambiguous set-up. Contrary to the findings by Dwivedi,
Phillips, Einagel, and Baum (2010) who found no evidence for the commitment to one
interpretation with semantically ambiguous texts, the present findings indicated such a
commitment: Participants committed to one dominant interpretation of the ambiguous
textual input, rather than remaining undecided about the underspecified or misleading
discourse. This initial incoherence led to the experience of incongruity which has been
pointed out as a key element in the perception of humorous stimuli (e.g., Forabosco,
1992; Giora, 1991; McGhee, 1979; Nerhardt, 1977; Suls, 1972).
In the processing stages following the N400 e↵ect, we found mixed evidence that was
strongly a↵ected by the context. In Experiment 2, joke endings also elicited a weak sus-
tained N400 e↵ect. In Experiment 3, however, this sustained N400 did not occur with
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the absence of incoherent endings in the experimental setting. In both experiments, we
found no convincing evidence for the LLAN e↵ect for the joke endings. Nevertheless, in
Experiment 3, when incoherent endings were absent from the experimental design, there
was a peak of negative amplitudes at left anterior electrodes around 600 ms after the
stimulus onset. The amplitude of this negativity additionally was significantly a↵ected
by participants’ general comprehension ability. Coulson and Kutas (2001), and Coulson
and Lovett (2004) had previously found a stronger LLAN e↵ect for better comprehen-
ders and an enhanced N400 e↵ect for poor comprehenders. Together with the present
findings, it is not reliably possible to argue for the existence of this component. If –
and that remains the question – there is a LLAN component that truly reflects addi-
tional processing e↵ort during discourse comprehension, or in particular the semantic
re-interpretation necessary for the re-establishment of a coherent discourse during joke
comprehension, then this component is characterized by three points: It is (i) weak
in e↵ect size, hence not reliably elicited in experiments; (ii) strongly susceptible to
contextual influences that disable participants to engage in additional processing e↵ort
for successful comprehension; for example in Experiment 2 the presence of incoherent
endings might have su ced to make participants think that a joke ending o↵ers no re-
interpretation, which resulted in a sustained N400 e↵ect instead of LLAN activity; and
(iii) strongly susceptible to individual discourse comprehension ability; activity of this
component might not be restricted to joke comprehension ability.
Contrary to previous findings with joke material (Coulson & Lovett, 2004; Marinkovic
et al., 2011), no evidence was found for the hypothesized (posterior) P600 component.
We could not find any hint for a similarity between the well-studied (mainly syntactic)
GP sentences and the (mainly semantic) GP jokes. Nevertheless, we did find a frontal
late positivity for the joke endings in Experiment 2 which was diminished and non-
significant in Experiment 3. It appeared to be comparable to the frontal P600 which
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had been found for ambiguous and complex syntactic sentence parsing (Kaan & Swaab,
2003). It also was similar to a component reported for jokes that involved frame-shifting.
In these findings, the component was mainly present for right-handed women (Coulson
& Lovett, 2004). Nevertheless, the interpretation of this component remains unclear
and might also be related to the emotional reaction (see below).
Participants in the Joke condition were emotionally rewarded with the experience of
mirth. This was indicated by the rating of the humorous potential just as well as by the
larger pupillary response starting from 850 ms after the onset of the final word. Pupil di-
lation is known to accompany participants’ cognitive load and emotional arousal. Since
the pupil dilation in the current experiment was significantly higher only for the joke
endings, but not for the incoherent endings, we argue that this result mainly was based
on the emotional reaction. Incoherent endings were assumed to need cognitive process-
ing e↵ort for the detection of the incoherence, just as for a possible revision attempt.
If the larger pupil dilation for the joke endings was related to the cognitive load plus
the emotional reaction this would mean that the absence of larger pupil dilation for the
incoherent endings was due to a lack of higher cognitive processing e↵ort. This interpre-
tation, however, was contradicted by the longer reading times for the incoherent endings
compared to the coherent endings. Therefore, larger pupil dilation for the joke endings
was mainly based on the emotional reaction of mirth. The emotional reaction might
have also been reflected by the di↵erences in the Late Positivity mean amplitudes at
prefrontal electrode sites in Experiment 2. This frontal positivity became predominant
for the joke endings in the same time window as the significantly larger pupil dilations.
Previously, emotional reactions to joke stimuli or to other emotional verbal stimuli had
been related to late positivity components which were similar to the present results
(Du et al., 2013). Nevertheless, typical late positivities related to an emotional reaction
usually have a more posterior distribution. Therefore, the present interpretation of the
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frontal positivity remains speculative. No ratings of the subjective experience of mirth
for the individual participants were carried out in this study. Comparing such ratings
to the amplitude of the frontal positivity component could help to find better evidence
for such an interpretation. The precise functional equivalent and the reliability of the
frontal positivity still remain unclear given the current evidence.
The comparison of the joke endings with the incoherent endings was new in the present
study. Incoherent endings were harder (or impossible) to be semantically integrated in
the discourse. This was also reflected by longer reading times compared to the coherent
endings, better comprehensibility in the ratings study, and mainly by a stronger and
more sustained N400 component compared to both the joke and the coherent endings.
Further, the incoherent endings showed a context sensitive activation pattern of the late
positivity components, a pattern which also remains unclear given the current evidence.
Also, the incoherent endings did show the smallest pupil dilation, probably related to
the lack of an emotional response, and probably also indicating lower cognitive load
compared to the coherent endings and to the joke endings (see above). This suggests
that the processing of totally incoherent endings di↵ers from the processing of the joke
endings. The di↵erences in the N400 component indicate that the processing starts
to diverge at a very early stage of the comprehension, namely right at the stage of
the word recognition. While the joke endings very early seemed to trigger the search
for the alternative interpretation and the revision of the semantic representation, as
reflected by the reduced N400 e↵ect, this process is either absent or less emphasized
for the incoherent endings. Following processing stages of incoherent endings strongly
depended on the context. The mere presence of the joke endings in Experiment 2 seemed
to have altered the processing after the detection of the semantic incoherence compared
to the processing of the very same endings in Experiment 4. In the latter experiment,
incoherent endings elicited a typical posterior P600 activation. One possible explanation
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could be that the absence of joke endings made it clear to the participants that no
coherent explanation was provided. Accordingly, participants were better able to engage
in monitoring strategies that signal the impossibility of a successful comprehension,
possibly reflected by the posterior P600 activity. A similar functional equivalent of the
P600 component had previously been proposed by Van Herten et al. (2005).
Limitations of the study have to be pointed out. The whole lab situation is an artificial
setting. Participants had to sit in a computer lab or, as for the ERP experiments, in
a dark EEG lab. A large amount of short texts had to be read on a computer screen
in a way which might be very distinct from natural reading processes (moving windows
paradigm, RSVP), and especially from the usual social interaction of joke telling. Fur-
thermore, participants read every text fragment three times or two times respectively
in the control studies. Even though we balanced out the order of the conditions for
the participants, this repetition probably had an impact on the processing of all three
conditions. However, this design had the advantage of keeping all experimental settings
apart from the crucial final word between the three conditions completely identical.
Moreover, all experimental results were aggregated across 48 di↵erent stimuli, assuming
a fairly homogeneous stimulus material. Despite the focus on GP jokes, which is a more
precise definition and scope of the stimulus material than in previous studies related to
verbal humor, the ratings suggested quite a high variance within the stimuli in terms of
predictability, comprehensibility, and humorous potential. An in depth-analysis on the
stimulus level might enrich the present results with a more fine-grained understanding
of the processes in relationship to inherent stimulus features.
Further research should address more precisely the functional relationships of the de-
scribed ERP components. Especially the interpretation of the frontal positivity, which
was found in Experiment 2 for joke endings compared to both to coherent and to incoher-
ent endings remains speculative. Since joke endings in the present study were di↵erent
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to the other conditions by two features, the revision and the emotional response, the
component could be related to any of these two processes. Siebörger (2006) carried out
an fMRI study in order to disentangle the cognitive processes of joke comprehension
from the emotional reactions. He compared GP jokes (revision plus emotional reac-
tion) to texts which he called “Revisionsgeschichten (revision texts)” (revision but no
emotional reaction), to straight coherent (no revision needed) and to incoherent texts
(no coherence, no revision, no emotional reaction). The results indicated di↵erences
for all three hypothesized processes. A similar design as an ERP study would be a
very useful next step. Future research could also investigate the nature of the N400
during joke comprehension in more detail by manipulating the salience of the initially
dominant interpretation (possible increase of the N400 e↵ect) and the accessibility of
the hidden interpretation (possible increase of the LLAN component or reduction of the
N400 e↵ect) of the joke endings by contextual priming prior to the stimulus presentation
(Mayerhofer & Schacht, 2013).
The present experiments hardly allow distinguishing the theoretical account of frame-
shifting (Coulson & Kutas, 1998; Coulson, 2001) from the focus on the revision, as
in the present account. Both accounts share the general idea of a re-interpretation
process. This re-interpretation is in line with the assumption of incremental and non-
monotonic reasoning processes based on inferential belief updates and permanent and
active constructions of situation models during language comprehension in order to
coherently represent the meaning of a text (Baggio et al., 2008). Even if an interpretation
once has been established, it does not mean that this interpretation cannot be overridden







In the present study, we were mainly interested in how contextual constraints can a↵ect
neuro-cognitive processing of a GP joke by referring to two crucial features of these
texts: salience and accessibility (see below). Take (1) as an example for a GP joke.
(1) I would love to die like my grandfather, peacefully and calm during
sleep (SU). Not frightened, screaming, and su↵ering like his passengers (PL).
(Attributed to Bob Monkhouse1)
In (1), the first sentence provides the SU. The final word “passengers” of the second
sentence is the crucial disambiguating element of the PL and will thus be referred to
as the PL. Default interpretation of the SU leads to the mental representation that
the grandfather died in his bed since this is the most plausible scenario given the cues
from the text. Under the assumption of this initially dominant interpretation (SU1)
the information from the PL triggers the detection of an incoherent discourse since
the causal connection between the two sentences remains unclear. Accordingly, the




hidden joke interpretation (SU2), “the grandfather died while driving a public bus”. This
change of the semantic representation in addition to the sudden shift from one frame of
knowledge to a di↵erent one, called“frame-shifting”(Coulson, 2001) or“script-switching”
(Attardo & Raskin, 1991), appears to be a crucial element for the humorous potential
of this huge subclass of verbally expressed humor; especially in combination with some
absurdity or “inappropriateness” (Ritchie, 2004, p.61) of the hidden interpretation.
Evidence for these assumed sequential (sub-)processes of discourse comprehension comes
from various studies which investigated the processing of jokes with stimulus material
that is highly comparable to what is called GP jokes in the present account. Vaid et al.
(2003) demonstrated priming e↵ects on the reaction times in lexical decisions that were
specifically related to the di↵erent stages of joke comprehension. Lexical decisions of
words that were semantically related to the non-joke interpretation were faster before
the occurrence of the set-up, while lexical decisions of joke-script related words were
faster right after the occurrence of the punch-line. This was taken as evidence that a
specific non-joke script (Attardo & Raskin, 1991), e.g., the bed room setting applied
to example (1), was predominantly activated during the SU, while the joke-script, e.g.,
tra c setting, was activated right after the occurrence of the PL. Further, self-paced
reading times (Coulson & Kutas, 1998), eye-fixation data (Coulson et al., 2006), and
ERP data (Coulson & Kutas, 2001; Coulson & Lovett, 2004; Coulson & Williams, 2005)
strongly suggest semantic integration di culties and higher processing e↵ort for the
comprehension of jokes compared to semantically coherent non-joke endings, assumed
to reflect processes of frame shifting as described above.
Two important features of GP jokes are the “degree of salience” (Giora, 2003) of the
initially predominant interpretation and the “degree of accessibility”2 of the hidden in-
2Ariel (1988, 2001) introduced the term accessibility as an important concept for the comprehension
of referring expressions in discourses. The term, with the meaning it is intended here, has been applied
to the comprehension of jokes before (De Palma & Weiner, 1992; Wyer & Collins, 1992) and also to
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terpretation.
In a recent theoretical account on salience and accessibility of GP jokes, Mayerhofer and
Schacht (2013) defined salience as a probabilistic function of linguistic and non-linguistic
cues of the initial part of the text (SU). The meaning construction in addition to the
explicit linguistic input also involves implicit and automatic inferences, mainly con-
cerning space, time, causation, protagonists, and objects (Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998).
Giora (2003) described the salience of a specific meaning in the context of a clearly
identifiable expression (e.g. an ambiguous word) as a function of conventionality, fa-
miliarity, frequency, and prototypicality (Rosch, 1999). Whenever there is ambiguity,
these factors decide which of the possible meanings is fore-grounded, i.e. highly salient,
in a recipient’s mind. In a similar manner, Goatly (2012, p. 276↵) pointed out the
influence of collocation patterns and concordance data on the salience of one interpre-
tation. What we call here the GP mechanism, Goatly referred to as “false priming”
(Goatly, 2012, p.276↵). Following that approach, a specific ending of a text should
become highly predictable mainly because of the surrounding words. Frequency mea-
sures of co-occurrences of surrounding words with the ambiguous element accordingly
should account for the degree of salience. In GP jokes, however, the salience of an in-
terpretation very often is based on a complex chunk of words and sentences (see Dynel,
2009, p.222↵). It is not always a clearly identifiable expression. Hence, salience of the
initial interpretation of a GP joke often cannot be easily accounted for by corpora-based
statistics. It is also empirically supported that contextual e↵ects on word recognition
due to “predictive inferences” in discourse comprehension are more strongly a↵ected by
the message-level of the discourse rather than by collocation patterns of semantically
related words (R. K. Morris, 1994). The underlying inferential processes integrate a
wide range of sources of knowledge (linguistic knowledge, pragmatic knowledge, world
the comprehension of metaphors (Werning, Fleischhauer, & Beseoglu, 2006).
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knowledge, social knowledge, etc.). Recently, Mayerhofer and Schacht (2013) modeled
salience in GP jokes as reasoning processes that rely on conditional probabilities of
a Bayesian Network-based knowledge representation, independently from the type of
knowledge to be activated. The default reasoning process leads to the initially domi-
nant interpretation and its semantic representation as a situation model (Van Dijk &
Kintsch, 1983). This first interpretation, respectively its situation model, is the one
with the least processing e↵ort and the highest ranked plausibility given an individual’s
subjective knowledge, context, memories, and experiences. In this sense, the salience of
an interpretation can vary between di↵erent individuals but can also vary within one in-
dividual depending on di↵erent contexts or time points. Accessibility (Ariel, 1988, 2001;
De Palma & Weiner, 1992; Wyer & Collins, 1992) – when applied to the phenomenon
of GP jokes – refers to the ease of retrieval of knowledge which can accommodate the
semantic irregularity of the PL (see Mayerhofer & Schacht, 2013). After a recipient
encounters the semantic incoherence, a new set of explanations for the whole discourse
needs to be found. In many cases, the activation of an alternative interpretation involves
other characters’ higher-order belief representations, shifting from one semantic field to
a completely di↵erent and contrasting semantic field (frame shifting), (causal) bridging
inferences, or engagement of specific (insider) world knowledge. For obvious reasons,
accessibility, despite being presented as a feature of the textual input, also can be mod-
ulated by recipients’ inter-individual di↵erences, such as specific world knowledge, the
ability of mind-set switching, or the amount of exposure to verbal humor. All these
factors together determine the ease of finding the hidden joke interpretation for the
recipient. Similar to the degree of salience, another important factor on the degree of
accessibility is the context of the joke. Applied to example (1), presenting the joke in a
setting that strongly activates knowledge related to bedroom or a hospital, the salience
of the initial interpretation should become increased. In contrast, presenting this joke in
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a setting which strongly pre-activates knowledge on tra c or accidents should increase
the degree of accessibility of the hidden interpretation.
We hypothesized that salience and accessibility are two distinguishable factors, which
jointly a↵ect the characteristics of processing GP jokes. However, even though both
factors were assumed to interplay in GP joke comprehension, we claimed that the direct
influences from these two factors could be experimentally tested. Since salience is a
feature of the initially dominant interpretation, we assumed that the degree of salience
a↵ects the degree of the initial incoherence after encountering the PL. The higher the
degree of salience, the stronger is the perception of the violation of the semantic coher-
ence at PL. Accessibility, on the other hand, is a feature of the alternative interpretation
and we assumed that it mainly a↵ects the ease of retrieval of the relevant knowledge
necessary for the hidden interpretation. Consequently, accessibility is associated with
the ease of revision of the situation model in order to re-establish a coherent meaning of
the otherwise incoherent discourse. The higher the degree of accessibility, the easier it
is to carry out the necessary belief revision by finding a new set of explanations which
can accommodate the irregularity of the PL.
4.2 Experiment 5: Contextual Constraint on Inter-
pretation Processes
In the present study, we manipulated salience and accessibility by pre-activating either
the initially dominant or the alternative hidden interpretation. If participants are –
prior to the GP joke – presented with a word which is semantically related to the ini-
tial interpretation, semantic content linked to the initial interpretation (SU1) should
be activated. Therefore, this prime condition should directly increase salience and also
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indirectly decrease accessibility. Priming the alternative interpretation (SU2), on the
contrary, should directly increase accessibility and also indirectly decrease salience. A
neutral, i.e. semantically unrelated word should not directly a↵ect salience or accessibil-
ity. However, neutral words might be misinterpreted as cues for alternative interpreta-
tions under the given boundary conditions of the present experimental manipulations. In
this case, the neutral word might indirectly decrease accessibility and, in addition, also
salience (see Figure 4.1(c) for a schematic representation of the design and experimental
manipulations).
We applied a self-paced moving window paradigm (Just et al., 1982). By doing so, the
reading time for every single word could be measured. Reading times are an accumu-
lation of several processing stages, ranging from recognition of a given word to higher
comprehension processes, such as the integration of a word with its co-text and context.
For GP jokes, the reading times of the PL (and possibly of a follow-up sentence) were
supposed to index the processing e↵ort and the additional working memory load during
the discourse comprehension process necessary for the successful joke comprehension as
outlined in the introduction. Final words of a sentence or a clause usually are associated
with longer reading times due to “wrap-up e↵ects” (Just & Carpenter, 1980; Rayner,
Kambe, & Du↵y, 2000; Rayner, Sereno, Morris, Schmauder, & Clifton Jr, 1989), tradi-
tionally described as the consequence of sentence internal integration processes. Some
preceding reading units cannot be completely processed until the final word appears.
Thus, the full processing is then completed with the final word. In addition, previous
research showed that comprehension di culties can have a delayed e↵ect. Rather than
increasing the reading time of the final word, there can be “spill-over” e↵ects on read-
ing units that appear after the crucial target word. These belated spill-over e↵ects are
an indicator of more complex comprehension issues due to persistent inconsistencies at
previous reading units (Calvo & Castillo, 1996; Just et al., 1982; Pexman, Ferretti, &
90
Katz, 2000).
Since the final word of the last sentence of GP jokes is the disambiguating element (PL),
at this reading position, the semantic incoherence occurs and belief revision processes
are initiated. Higher salience was hypothesized to lead to a stronger violation of the
semantic coherence, whereas higher accessibility should lead to an easier revision. Both
processes should be additional factors of the“wrap-up”and accordingly were assumed to
take place mainly immediately following the lexical recognition of the PL. Therefore, we
mainly expected an influence of the manipulation at the reading position of the PL. An
increase of the salience should lead to longer PL reading times while an increase of the
accessibility should lead to shorter reading times at the PL both compared to the neutral
condition. Spill-over e↵ects on the reading times of a follow-up sentence should reflect
later processing stages of the revision of initially dominant semantic representations.
Since the revision was hypothesized to be related to the degree of accessibility, we
predicted that higher accessibility should lead to shorter reading times at the position
of the follow-up sentence.
Given the hypothesized sequential nature of GP joke comprehension, we expected no
influence of the manipulation on the reading times of the set-up part of the text. Prior
the PL, the hidden joke interpretation should not be maintained. Thus, any manipula-
tion regarding the hidden interpretation should be ine↵ective at this stage of the joke.
Together, we were interested in the reading times of three reading positions: the SU,




Forty-six participants were tested. One participant had to be excluded due to a com-
prehension accuracy of less than 35% and due to highly deviant reading time patterns,
together indicating that the participant just clicked through the experiment without
proper processing of the texts. Remaining participants (32 females, 13 males) ranged in
age between 19 and 40 years (M = 24.36, SD = 4.15). All were native German speakers
and students of the University of Göttingen. They were reimbursed with course credits
or €5. They had not participated in any experiment with the same stimulus material.
Material
Forty-five GP jokes in German were used as the stimulus material. In all jokes, the
final word was the crucial disambiguating element of the PL. Each joke was additionally
followed by a neutral sentence continuing the general topic of the joke. Single prime
words were selected according to a text-linguistic analysis of the GP stimuli. A SU1
prime was a word which was semantically related to the first dominant interpretation
of the set-up of the joke. A SU2 prime was a word which was semantically related to
the second hidden interpretation of the set-up. Neutral words were chosen without any
strong relationship to possible interpretations of the set-up. This is an example stimulus
including the primes and the comprehension question (stimulus taken and adapted from
Dynel, 2009, p.276):
• Prime: SU1: Diät (Diet) SU2: Kerker (Jail) Neutral: Auto (Car)
• GP joke: Ich habe noch immer den Körper einer 18-Jährigen. Und zwar in meinem
Keller. (I still have the body of an eighteen-year-old. It is in my cellar.)
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• FS: Außerdem gibt es im Keller auch Ratten. (There are rats in the cellar as well.)
• Comprehension questions: Die Person ist ein Mörder. (The person is a murderer.)
(Yes/No).// Die Person hat einen gutgebauten Körper. (The person is in good
shape.) (Yes/No).
Three di↵erent sets of stimuli were created, counterbalancing the prime-GP combina-
tions. There was no GP joke repeated for a participant.
Procedure
The experiment was carried out in a group lab on a computer with groups of two to five
participants per session. After they had indicated the demographic data, participants
were instructed on the computer screen that they participated in an experiment on
text comprehension. They were made familiar with the presentation of the stimuli and
were told to carefully read the texts. Prior to the experimental trials, participants had
to complete three practice trials with GP jokes not overlapping with the experimental
stimuli. Each trial started with a fixation cross presented for 100ms after the participant
had pressed the space bar. Next, the prime word appeared for 1500ms on the center
of the computer screen, followed by a second fixation cross displayed for 500ms. Then,
the GP joke and the follow-up sentence were presented with an adapted version of the
self-paced moving window paradigm (Just et al., 1982), implemented by Pygame, a
graphical interface for Python. First, the whole GP joke was presented, with the whole
final sentence of the joke and the follow-up sentence being masked by blanks. This
sentence appeared word-by-word with separate button presses for each word. Only the
actual word appeared unmasked, whereas the preceding word became masked again.
After completion of the joke sentence the follow-up sentence was presented in the same
way (see Figure 4.1(b) for a screenshot of the presentation of the final sentence of the
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joke and the follow-up sentence). Each trial was followed by a comprehension question
which was randomly assigned to be answered with yes or no using the arrow keys.
Each participant completed a set of 45 trials consisting of 15 trials per condition (SU1
prime, SU2 prime, Neutral), in fully randomized order. Figure 4.1(a) gives an example
of a complete trial.
Analysis
A priori we were interested in three reading time variables, defined as our regions of
interest (T1, T2, and T3). T1 was the reading time of the whole text fragment before
the final sentence (SU). T2 was the reading time of the final word (PL), measured as the
time between the onset of the word and the button press to proceed with the follow-up
sentence. T3 was the average reading time of the follow-up sentence (FS), measured as
the average of the times between the onset of the words of the follow-up sentence and
the respective button presses. All reading time data (45 x 45 = 2025 observations) were
checked for plausibility. Visual and descriptive analyses revealed influential outliers in
both directions. Thus, all observations < 200ms and 2.5SD above each individual par-
ticipant’s mean were excluded for the dependent variables, T1 (exclusion rate: 7.36%),
T2 (3.46%), and T3 (2.96%). The trimmed data were aggregated by participant and
condition. These aggregated mean reading times in ms (per participant and condition)
were subjected to separate within One-Way-ANOVAs on T1, T2, and T3, respectively.
E↵ect sizes are reported as generalized eta square (Bakeman, 2005). We carried out
Bonferroni-corrected two-tailed t-tests for dependent groups for pair-wise comparisons.
Cohen’s d is reported as e↵ect size on the average SD from two means corrected for








SU1 prime: salience accessibility
SU2 prime: salience accessibility





Figure 4.1: (a) A schematic representation of the time course of the sequential presenta-
tion of a complete trial. (b) A screenshot of the self paced moving window presentation
of the example stimulus in German at the reading position of PL. (c) A schematic
representation of the design and the manipulations. Bold indicates a direct influence;
non-bold indicates only an indirect influence. The arrows indicate an increase or a




Overall, 74.85% of the comprehension questions were answered correctly. Comprehen-
sion accuracy did not di↵er across conditions (Ms = 74 to 76%, SDs = 43 to 44%).
Neither a One-way within ANOVA nor a non-parametric Friedman-test indicated that
there was any e↵ect of type of priming on comprehension accuracy.
Reading times
Descriptive data are presented in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.2. ANOVAs revealed a sig-
nificant e↵ect of Priming condition on T2, F (2, 88) = 3.63, p = .031, ⌘2G = .076,
and T3, F (2, 88) = 3.99, p = .021, ⌘2G = .083, but not on T1, F < 1. Accord-
ing to post-hoc t-tests, reading times at the PL (T2) were significantly shorter after
SU2 priming compared to SU1 priming, t(44) =  2.88, p = .006, d =  .440. Read-
ing times of the FS (T3) were significantly shorter after SU2 priming compared to
Neutral, t(44) =  2.89, p = .006, d =  .479. All other comparisons did not reach
statistical significance, although there was a trend for shorter reading times at the
PL after SU2 priming compared to Neutral, t(44) =  1.77, p = .083, d =  .239,
and for shorter reading times of FS after SU2 priming compared to SU1 priming,
t(44) =  1.55, p = .129, d =  .242.
4.2.3 Discussion
The present study aimed at investigating contextual influences on several stages of dis-
course comprehension in GP jokes. To this aim, we implemented a priming paradigm
in which single words either increased the salience by priming the initially predominant
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Table 4.1: Descriptive data of the reading times in Experiment 5 (N = 46)








































Figure 4.2: Z-transformed mean reading times (trimmed and aggregated across partici-
pants and condition) of words as a function of Priming Condition and the three regions
of interest: Set-up (reading time of the whole text fragment = T1), PL (final word =
T2), and FS (average reading time of the words of the follow-up sentence = T3).
interpretation or increased the accessibility by priming the hidden alternative interpre-
tation. Neutral words were unrelated to both conditions. Analyses of reading time data
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at di↵erent regions of interest (T1-set up; T2 -critical PL word; T3 -average reading
time of the follow-up sentence) revealed the following finding: First, no influence of
the priming manipulation was found on the reading times of the text fragment, the
set-up of the joke (T1), indicating the same processing of the SU independently from
the priming condition. Second, reading times at the PL (T2) were significantly longer
after priming of the initial interpretation (SU1) as compared with priming of the hidden
joke interpretation (SU2). Third, in contrast, the neutral condition led to significantly
longer reading times of the follow-up sentence when compared to the priming of the joke
interpretation.
These results mainly supported our hypotheses regarding the two relevant features of
GP joke processing – salience and accessibility. As outlined in the introduction, salience
refers to the degree of dominance of an initial default interpretation of a potentially am-
biguous discourse. Accessibility refers to the ease of detecting the hidden interpretation
and the retrieval of knowledge which allows integrating the new linguistic evidence in
order to re-establish a coherent semantic representation. Priming SU1 was hypothesized
to directly increase salience and to indirectly decrease accessibility. Priming SU2 should
directly facilitate the degree of accessibility and indirectly decrease salience. Accord-
ingly, we hypothesized shorter reading times of PL words for SU2 priming compared
to both neutral condition and SU1 priming. As expected, SU2 primed endings were
read significantly faster compared to SU1 primed endings. However, we found only a
strong tendency, but no significant di↵erence between the reading times at the PL of
SU2 primed and neutral endings.
As outlined in the introduction, reading time data for the final word presumably reflect
an accumulation of several processing stages involved that can be pre-lexical (e.g. vi-
sual perception of the letters, the detection of the orthographical pattern), lexical (e.g.,
selection of lexical candidates), or post-lexical (e.g., integration of the word into its
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preceding discourse and context) (e.g., R. K. Morris, 1994). There is evidence that con-
textual constraints a↵ect predictive inferences and anticipation-based word recognition
on a pre-lexical or lexical level (Calvo & Castillo, 1996; Calvo, 2000; R. K. Morris, 2006;
Van Berkum, Brown, Zwitserlood, Kooijman, & Hagoort, 2005). Thus, one plausible
impact of SU2 priming could be a faster lexical access of the PL word in this condition.
Such a mechanism should be restricted to the condition of increased accessibility, i.e.,
SU2 priming, since there was no direct relationship between (non-)prime and PL words
in the other conditions (SU1 prime and neutral). Importantly, such lexical priming
would have a functional locus prior to the processing stages suggested to be specifi-
cally relevant for GP joke comprehension, i.e., detection of incoherence and revision
processes, but it might subsequently facilitate these more complex comprehension pro-
cesses at later stages. Accordingly, recognition facilitation at a pre-/lexical level might
partly account for significantly shorter PL reading times for SU2 priming. However,
such mechanism cannot explain why the e↵ects of SU2 priming compared to the neu-
tral condition occurred later in time, i.e. as spill-over e↵ects at the follow-up sentence.
This specificity in the time course of the e↵ects needs to be addressed by considering
potential post-lexical influences.
Spill-over e↵ects are usually associated more strongly with post-lexical processing stages
or with a lack of comprehension given its persistence and delayed and long-lasting oc-
currence (see Just et al., 1982, p.232↵). For example, Pexman et al. (2000) reported
evidence for enhanced spill-over e↵ects for the additional comprehension e↵ort of sar-
castic interpretations of metaphors, also using a moving window paradigm. These au-
thors argued that the spill-over e↵ects are related to the “settling of inconsistencies and
comprehension issues that have not been completed earlier in the processing sequence”
(Pexman et al., 2000, p.219). We suggest similar higher-level comprehension mecha-
nisms to be responsible for the spill-over e↵ects in the present experiment. Our data
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suggest that our experimental manipulations a↵ected the time course of the comprehen-
sion and the initiation of the revision process.
Therefore, the remaining important question concerns the di↵erences between the SU1
vs. SU2 comparison and the neutral vs. SU2 comparison. Calvo (2000) reported evi-
dence for a relationship between the degree of contextual constraint and the dynamics
of facilitation e↵ects of predictive inferences over time in a word naming paradigm.
Higher semantic constraint was accompanied by earlier facilitation e↵ects of predictive
inferences. A similar process might be responsible for an earlier e↵ect of the contextual
constraint in the SU1 primed condition compared to the delayed e↵ect in the neutral
condition. The SU1 prime enhanced the semantic constraint by increasing the salience
of the initial interpretation, leading to stronger predictive inferences. Accordingly, the
violation of the coherence directly at the PL position was emphasized. This empha-
sis might have prompted participants to re-analyze the semantic representation of the
discourse leading to longer wrap-up e↵ects right at the final word (PL). In the neutral
condition, the semantic constraint remained constant compared to the SU2 primed con-
dition, while accessibility was lower compared to the SU2 condition, delaying revision
processes. Thus, the di↵erence between the neutral condition (low salience and low
accessibility) and the SU2-primed condition (low salience and high accessibility) did not
become statistically significant until only after the PL, that is at the follow-up sentence.
Further research is needed to clarify the observed di↵erences between the manipulations
of the degree of salience on the one side and the degree of accessibility on the other side.
If the present interpretation is correct and the present reading time patterns reflect an
altered time course of the joke comprehension due to di↵erent semantic constraints, one
could expect a comparable pattern of e↵ects on ERP components which had previously
been related to the processing of jokes, namely the N400 component (word recognition,
detection of incoherence, and semantic integration di culties) and a late left-anterior
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negativity component (revision, frame-shifting, enhanced working-memory related pro-
cesses) (see Coulson & Kutas, 2001; Coulson & Lovett, 2004).
One major limitation of the present study is the artificial setting and the unnatural
reading format, not to mention the lack of a social and oral context in which a joke
usually is embedded. For instance, the self-paced-moving window technique used in our
experiment does not allow for saccades, regressions or skippings, which typically occur
with skilled readers (see e.g., Just et al., 1982; Just & Carpenter, 1980). Therefore, a
follow-up study with the tracking of eye-gaze durations could help to get a clearer picture
of the involved processes. Also, the repetition of 45 GP jokes might have familiarized
the participants with the underlying mechanisms of interest, possibly obscuring natural
joke comprehension processes. Moreover, the comprehension questions were aimed at
asking for the semantic representation of the discourse without baring their function to
the participants. As a consequence, these questions were not related to specific single
elements of the previous discourse but rather gave ample space for individual interpre-
tations. This characteristic might explain the overall low comprehension accuracy found
in the present study. Self-reports from participants indicated that they occasionally did
not answer the comprehension questions in the “correct” way despite having correctly
understood the joke.
Despite these weaknesses, the present results indicate the importance of contextual
constraint during discourse comprehension on two distinguishable, yet dynamically in-
teracting, features of discourses that exploit the GP mechanism. The manipulation of
the contextual constraint led to either a manipulation of the degree of salience of the
initial interpretation or to a manipulation of the accessibility of the hidden interpreta-
tion. Most importantly, distinguishable manipulations resulted in an alteration of the
time course of the hypothesized sequential processing stages. This indicates that joke
comprehension, and discourse comprehension in general, can be significantly altered
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depending on the type of manipulation that is carried out by contextual constraints.
Previous research on priming e↵ects mainly dealt with the direction from mental repre-
sentations of a discourse (i.e. on the message level) to word recognition (see R. K. Morris,
2006, for an overview). The current study investigated the reversed direction and high-





5.1 Empirical Evidence: Quasi-Replication and New
Findings
One aim of the dissertation project was finding empirical evidence for the hypothesized
sequential nature of GP joke processing. This processing focused on three core stages:
detection of the violation of coherence, revision of the semantic representation, and
emotional reaction. The present data backed up previous findings related to joke and
humor processing reported by Coulson and Kutas (1998, 2001); Coulson (2001); Coulson
and Lovett (2004). (i) Reading time data revealed higher working memory load for
joke endings compared to coherent endings. Joke endings need more processing e↵ort
than its coherent versions. This significant di↵erence in the reading time of the final
word was assumed to be a cumulative measure of the first two processing stages (i.e.
the detection of the violation, and the revision; perhaps also including the emotional
reaction). (ii) An enhanced N400 component presumably indicated the detection of
the incoherence, respectively the semantic integration di culty, following the lexical
recognition of the punch line word. Subsequent ERP components could not be backed
up to the same extent. An enhanced left anterior negativity had been previously reported
and had been speculated to be related to the re-interpretation stage and to the ability to
comprehend a joke by carrying out the frame shifting (Coulson, 2001; Coulson & Lovett,
2004). Accordingly, the component was hypothesized to reflect higher working memory
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engagement. Empirical findings of this component could only be partially replicated.
The present data were not convincing, and such a component was not clearly evoked by
joke endings compared to coherent endings. Nevertheless ERP data in Experiment 3
showed a similar activation pattern compared to previous studies for a very restricted
time window and scalp distribution. Also, the relationship between this component and
comprehension ability was backed up by the present results. Activation patterns of a
possible posterior P600 were not found at all in the present data for the processing of
GP jokes. However, some mixed evidence for a possible frontal P600 was presented.
This activation pattern needs much further exploration in terms of its reliability and its
functional aspect.
New empirical data in this dissertation project mainly involved three findings: (i) the
comparison of joke endings to totally incoherent endings, (ii) the pupil dilation data,
(iii) and the manipulation e↵ects of contextual constraint on the reading time of GP joke
endings and its follow-up sentence. As for the first aspect, reading time data and the
ERP data clearly indicated initially similar activation patterns between joke endings and
incoherent endings, although ERP data indicated that semantic integration di culty
was significantly lower for joke endings. This implies that at a very early stage, starting
after 250 ms after the reading of the punch-line, joke endings presumably led to spreading
activation of relevant knowledge that eased the integration of the ending compared to a
totally incoherent ending. These activation patterns, however, were even more strongly
diverging at later processing stages. While incoherent endings also took longer to be
processed by participants compared to coherent endings, a stronger and sustained N400
component for incoherent endings compared to joke endings accompanied the lack of
a successful reinterpretation and accordingly a lack of comprehension. Additionally
contextual influences (the experimental setting) strongly a↵ected later processing stages
of the incoherent endings. The mere presence or absence of joke endings altered the
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neuro-cognitive activity in the time window after a sustained N400 component (from
700 ms after the stimulus onset onwards). This alteration was presumably related to the
experimental setting. In Experiment 2 participants could not know for sure whether a
given ending of a text was simply incoherent and impossible to be semantically integrated
or whether it was a joke ending for which no alternative interpretation had been found
yet. Consequently, participants might have started the same revision processes as for
GP joke endings, but failed at finding an alternative interpretation. Reading time data
of Experiment 1 indicated quite a persistent willingness to search for an alternative
interpretation even in the absence of such a reinterpretation possibility. In Experiment 3,
incoherent endings were probably recognized as what they were, and the ERP activity
showed indications of a typical posterior P600 pattern. This finding speaks for the role
of the P600 as a monitoring component which signals the reader about the correctness
of their reading process (Van Herten et al., 2005).
Pupil size data of Experiment 2 revealed that joke endings led to significantly larger
pupil dilations than both coherent and incoherent endings starting from around 800
ms after the appearance of the punch-line. This di↵erence was characterized by huge
e↵ect sizes and by a long-lasting nature (until 3000 ms after the onset and possibly
even longer). Especially, the correlation between the average pupil dilation (aggregated
by participants) of a stimulus with the average rating of the humorous potential of a
stimulus (see Appendix C) strongly backs up the interpretation that pupil dilation is
associated with the emotional reaction as a consequence of a humorous stimulus (see
below for implications of this e↵ect).
The manipulation of contextual constraint in Experiment 5 and its alteration of the time
course of the sequential processing stages of GP jokes can be considered as empirical ev-
idence for core theoretical assumptions of Chapter 2. It was hypothesized that salience
and accessibility are two important concepts on the side of stimulus features that influ-
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ence the processing of GP jokes. Both factors were hypothesized to be susceptible to the
contextual setting of a GP joke. The experimental manipulation either increased the
availability of semantic content related to the initially dominant interpretation or the
availability of semantic content related to the hidden alternative interpretation. It was
hypothesized that either the detection of the coherence violation or the re-interpretation
and belief revision process would be a↵ected. Even though the present results indicated
that both factors are highly interacting, the usefulness of this conceptualization was
established. Mainly, a general processing advantage was found for an increase of the
accessibility of the hidden meaning. This advantage of an increased accessibility mani-
fested itself earlier compared to trials with increased salience as compared to trials with
salience being kept constant.
5.2 Implications
Theoretical elaboration of the hypothesized processing of verbal GP humor was the
other aim of this dissertation project. This aim was mainly addressed by the second
chapter. The processing of GP jokes was embedded in a probabilistic frame work of dis-
course comprehension. It was modeled as inferential reasoning with the goal of meaning
construction. The recipient tries to maintain a coherent representation of an ambiguous
textual input. These probabilistic reasoning processes were hypothesized to be carried
out in an intuitive and automatic manner. Only the statistically most plausible inter-
pretation given contextual, linguistic, and knowledge related cues is represented. This
automatic interpretation, however, can be retracted as a consequence of new surpris-
ing and incongruent textual input. In an incremental and non-monotonic manner, new
knowledge can be retrieved. Based on this newly retrieved knowledge, the initial inter-
pretation is substituted by an alternative hidden interpretation that can better explain
106
the new input. These sequential and basic processes had been suggested in di↵erent
terms before in humor theories (e.g., Attardo & Raskin, 1991; Ritchie, 2004; Suls, 1972)
just as in theories of discourse comprehension (e.g., Baggio et al., 2008). However, the
focus on a specific subclass of verbal humor allowed the processes to be narrowed down
and modeled in more detail. The crucial aspect of the present theoretical account was
the focus on the revision of the semantic representation, referred to as “belief revision”.
This focus distinguished it from other linguistically oriented accounts on joke processing
and also from the cognitive-linguistics approach of frame-shifting (Coulson, 2001), even
though the latter concept can be considered as highly similar, and also was integrated
in the current model. The frame-shifting account seems to imply that actual shifting
from one frame to another is always necessarily involved. In the present account, frame
shifting was not considered to be the core element of the processing but only a possi-
ble additional factor of the belief revision process. This focus on the belief revision is
in line with the neuro-cognitive theory put forward by Hurley et al. (2011) who have
claimed that humor has developed as an emotional reward for overcoming committed
false beliefs. The present empirical data, however, do not allow to distinguish the present
account from previous accounts, since most incongruity based accounts on humor share
these basic sequential processing assumptions and can hardly be di↵erentiated by their
empirical predictions.
One new theoretical development of the dissertation projection was the conceptualiza-
tion of probabilistic salience and accessibility. They were at the core of the presented
model. Predictions derived from these considerations were tested empirically and partly
confirmed in Experiment 5. GP Jokes are not a totally homogenous class of stimuli.
Subtle di↵erences in the linguistic features of these stimuli can strongly influence the
way they are processed. Salience and accessibility might be important factors that have
to be acknowledged for the investigation of humor. Di↵erent manipulations of these
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two factors led to di↵erent reading time patterns. Nevertheless, the strong relationships
between various factors that have been modeled in a fairly independent manner indicate
the importance of acknowledging a highly interactive network of stimulus features and
the neuro-cognitive processing of these features. Disentangling these highly interacting
factors can only be achieved in a limited way for the purpose of empirical investigations.
Separating and isolating them can be fruitful for a more detailed understanding, but
any artificial operationalization aiming for such a dissociation will only partially reflect
the true nature of the comprehension process of GP jokes and verbal humor in general.
The focus of this dissertation project was the cognitive mechanisms involved in the com-
prehension process. Many questions regarding the humorous potential of GP jokes had
been left out from the empirical investigations, as well as from the theoretical elabora-
tions. The main reason for this was the sheer complexity of the phenomenon of humor.
A stimulus that is reliably perceived as humorous usually combines many di↵erent char-
acteristics striving for a synergetic e↵ect. The display of superiority (Gruner, 2000),
tension relief due to taboos, sexual content, aggression (Freud, 1905), a dissociated and
playful state of mind – as opposed to a goal-oriented state of mind – (Apter, 1989) and
many other factors have been suggested in the literature as essential characteristics of
a humorous experience. On top of it, humor is usually embedded in a social and non-
threatening context (Gervais & Wilson, 2005). Therefore, many more factors related
to this social interaction and to the performance style will come into play. Within the
current frame work, all these factors could best be considered as “additional flavors” of a
specific stimulus. They have to be isolated in the same manner as the GP mechanism in
the current approach in order to allow valid conclusions about their workings. Certainly,
it is very rewarding to focus on these factors. This dissertation project aimed to omit
them in order to get a clearer picture and empirical support for the mechanisms that
are related to the GP phenomenon.
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Furthermore, the elaboration and development of a methodological tool box for the in-
vestigation of GP jokes was a subgoal of this aim. Empirical correlates that have been
shown to be useful psycholinguistic research methods for this purpose were: rating stud-
ies, reading time data, ERP data, pupil dilation, and manipulations of the contextual
constraint.
The rating data presented in Experiment 1 and the intercorrelations between the ratings
(see Appendix C) indicated a strong relationship between the predictability of the ending
and the comprehensibility of the joke on the one hand, and between both of these
factors with the humorous potential of a joke on the other hand. Figure 5.1 depicts a
graphical overview of the theoretical concepts and the empirical correlates that might
be together responsible for the processing of GP jokes. All of these factors strongly
interact. Accordingly, strong relationships between these factors and these correlates
are expected and need to be acknowledged. Still, methodological improvements of the
items used for a rating study could help to achieve a stronger dissociation of salience
and accessibility, and possibly of other concepts that might be helpful for the dissection
of this dynamic interaction.
The self-paced reading time data of Experiment 5 highlighted the importance of sepa-
rating the reading time of the final word (pre-lexical, lexical and wrap-up stage) of the
text and the reading time of a follow-up sentence. The latter measure variable was con-
sidered to be more strongly related to higher-level discourse processing. Furthermore,
the priming of a specific interpretation by contextual cues emerged to be a fruitful ex-
perimental manipulation. Previously, priming studies had only investigated the priming
e↵ect of a specific interpretation during joke comprehension on the lexical recognition
of a word (Vaid et al., 2003).
In terms of ERP components, the most suitable and robust measure variable for the
investigation of GP jokes emerged to be the N400 component, thus backing up previous
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investigations of highly similar stimulus material (Derks et al., 1997; Coulson & Kutas,
2001; Coulson & Lovett, 2004; Coulson & Williams, 2005). A component that can be
described as a late left anterior negativity (LLAN) was further investigated under the
assumption that it is a functional equivalent of the additional processing e↵ort neces-
sary for the successful comprehension of GP jokes. This investigation did not lead to
convincing evidence. In addition to previous findings (Coulson & Kutas, 2001; Coulson
& Lovett, 2004), however, the present data pointed towards a more general role of a
possible LLAN component. The component might be associated with discourse compre-
hension, not only relevant for joke and humor comprehension. Given this interpretation
it might be fruitful to relate the component to other neuro-cognitive correlates that have
been suggested for discourse comprehension processes. fMRI studies have revealed that
search for coherence and coherence building during discourse comprehension is accompa-
nied by increased activation in the dorso-medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) (Siebörger,
Ferstl, & von Cramon, 2007). Recently, Mossbridge, Grabowecky, Paller, and Suzuki
(2013) have been able to predict comprehension accuracy in reading comprehension by
ERP data that were transformed via a current-source-density index. Visual inspec-
tion of their presented untransformed data in the appendix also revealed a left anterior
negativity related to the comprehension e↵ort.
Lastly, the present data showed the high relevance of the investigation of pupil dila-
tion during the comprehension of verbal humor. Pupil dilation was strongly associated
with the humorous potential of GP jokes, presumably with the emotional reaction to
humorous stimuli in general. GP jokes in Experiment 2 led to huge e↵ects of higher
pupil dilation. The strong correlation between the ratings of the humorous potential
and participants’ average pupil size in response to a given stimulus (see Appendix C)
additionally backed up this interpretation. Together, these findings underline the im-
portance of pupil dilation as a measure variable for future investigations of humorous
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stimuli for a wide range of research questions related to the emotional reaction to hu-
mor. This emotional reaction has been referred to as mirth (Martin, 2007), amusement,
or exhilaration (Ruch, 1993). Earlier research had shown that exposure to humor can
a↵ect psychophysiological parameters like skin conductance and heart rate (Averill,
1969; Godkewitsch, 1976), loss of muscle tone (Overeem, Lammers, & Van Dijk, 1999),
and other parameters (see for a review on cardiovascular, respiratory, and electrodermal
measures Kreibig, 2010, p.406). To my knowledge, pupil dilation had not been shown as
a result of exposure to humorous stimuli. Importantly, the psychophysiological changes
related to humor are not mere side e↵ects of laughter. They are assumed to stem from
increased sympathetic nervous system activation due to the emotional elaboration of
the stimuli (Martin, 2007, p.163). Increased pupil dilation has also been assumed to
stem from increased sympathetic nervous system activation (Bradley et al., 2008).
Gervais and Wilson (2005) have suggested that humor and laughter have evolution-
arily developed within the context of social play. Laughter served as a signal to the
group that a non-threatening, safe environment allows the engagement in playful be-
havior and partial detachment from goal-oriented behavior (Apter, 1989). In line with
the “broaden-and-build-theory” of positive emotions (Fredrickson, 1998; Fredrickson &
Branigan, 2005), they further argue that this emotion-induced behavior led to adaptive
advantages in terms of the strengthening of cognitive, physical, and social resources.
However, the basic functions of laughter and humor were co-opted in many ways. As
argued by Hurley et al. (2011), this emotional reaction in terms of the cognitive re-
sources seems to be especially associated with the detection and revision of committed
false beliefs, since quick adaptation to changing and surprising new environments is one
of the crucial aspects of survival and fitness. A GP joke can be considered as playful,
non-serious and non-goal-oriented communication that allows to practice these evolu-
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Figure 5.1: Text and GP joke comprehension as interaction between a stimulus and
a recipient. Theoretical concepts on both sides of this interaction and its empirical
correlates investigated, supported, and suggested within the dissertation project.
triggering the emotional reaction of mirth.
5.3 Future Direction
Future studies on verbal humor in general and on GP jokes could investigate in more de-
tail the influence of participant features. In Chapter 2, it has been assumed that working
memory skills (mind set switching, retrieval of knowledge, monitoring skills) are highly
involved in the processing of GP jokes. Also, pragmatic skills, cognitive style, or verbal
intelligence have been hypothesized to strongly a↵ect the way a humorous stimulus is
perceived and elaborated. Operationalizations of these concepts can shed more light
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on the hypothesized processing and seem feasible to be carried out. The current data,
together with previous findings, pointed towards a relationship between comprehension
accuracy and a specific ERP component that manifested itself as a (late) left anterior
negativity. Comprehension accuracy, however, is only a very indirect auxiliary variable.
Presumably it reflects a combination of the above mentioned theoretical concepts of
participant features. Isolating these concepts from each other will be a useful next step
for empirical investigations of joke processing.
Rating studies and reading time data in future investigations could be adapted in or-
der to reflect more precisely the theoretical concepts that were depicted in Chapter 2.
Particularly, hypotheses derived from the conceptualization of salience and accessibility
could be addressed by items that allow to better distinguish between cognitive processes
that are a consequence of features a↵ecting the salience of the initially dominant inter-
pretation and those that a↵ect the accessibility of the hidden joke interpretation. The
present results, however, indicate that salience and accessibility strongly interact with
each other, so maybe such a distinction might not be achieved at all.
In general, ERP investigations will have to explore in more detail the functional equiva-
lents of the found ERP activation patterns. The N400 component was hypothesized to
be related to stimulus features (predictability of the punch-line, salience of the dominant
interpretation, contextual constraint) and to participant features (exposure to verbal
humor, contextual priming, pragmatic skills) that together determine how strongly a
recipient is committed to one specific dominant interpretation. In a similar manner,
the late left anterior negativity was hypothesized to be related to factors that a↵ect the
ease of retrieval of semantic knowledge necessary to successfully re-establish a coherent
interpretation of the initially incoherent discourse. But more empirical data are needed
to get a clear picture regarding this hypothesized relationship. Evidence in this disser-
tation project concerning that matter was mixed. Last but not least, late positivities
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– especially the frontal P600 – need further investigation. Currently, interpretations
regarding functional equivalents of this component remain highly speculative. One pos-
sible interpretation was that this component could be related to the stage of emotional
elaboration (Wyer & Collins, 1992; Du et al., 2013). If this assumption is correct,
participant ratings directly after each trial concerning the emotional reaction of mirth
towards a presented joke should be associated with such an ERP activation pattern.
Data in this dissertation project did not point towards such a relationship.
In regards to the emotional processing of GP jokes and humorous stimuli, future inves-
tigations can apply pupil dilation data as a reliable measure variable of the emotional
reaction, amusement or mirth. The humorous potential of a GP joke was described
as a combination of incongruity that is based on the GP mechanism and of secondary
incongruity that is transported via the content of the plot or story of a GP joke. Many
research questions that had been omitted in the current dissertation project due to its
focus on the cognitive mechanism could be addressed in more detail by experimental
designs that make use of pupil dilation as the dependent variable. Factors that had
been neglected as irrelevant “additional flavors” of the jokes in respect to their semantic
content, such as the display of superiority, sexual content, taboos, tension relief, etc.
could be manipulated. Such an operationalization could allow the investigation of the
influence these factors have on the humorous potential of the stimulus. Previous in-
vestigations on verbal humor, just as the present dissertation project, have helped to
understand in more detail the cognitive processing of verbal humor and the emotional
reaction triggered merely by the cognitive mechanism. The most relevant question in
the field of humor research, however, that still – some people might add fortunately
– remains highly mysterious and magical given the current state of research, could be
addressed with this variable: What is it that makes a joke really funny?
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5.4 Concluding Remarks
The processing of GP jokes was investigated as a dynamic interaction between a reader
and a text as a stimulus that carries the potential to be perceived as humorous by the
reader. Features and concepts on both sides of this interaction have been elaborated on
a theoretical level and empirically challenged in a series of experiments. Some of the
hypothesized processes and relationships within this modeled interaction have been em-
pirically well supported, some need further clarification, while others have been modeled
in order to be addressed in more detail in future investigations. Text comprehension and
humor comprehension are both research fields that carry great di culties because of the
complexity of factors that are contributing to their workings. By focusing on a specific
mechanism, and by limiting the research to small units of research objects that are fea-
sible and operationalizable for experimental settings, however, this dissertation project
could help to get a better understanding of this complex interaction between a reader
and a short humorous text like a GP joke. Despite the brevity of a GP joke, the present
findings possibly can be extended to bigger discourses, texts, or films that exploit this
mechanism on a larger scale. Findings of this project mainly underline one essential
characteristic of the human mind related to humor. The cognitive system incrementally
uses cues in the environment in order to build up an internal mental representation of
the ongoing (textual) input. Unexpected surprising input that does not fit the internal
mental representation triggers non-monotonic revision processes that can lead to a quick
adaptation of this representation. Within a playful state of mind, these processes can be
practiced by humor and joke comprehension. The benefits of this engagement usually
are socially and intellectually rewarding. These benefits are the reasons why humor is
so ubiquitous and usually highly appreciated in the behavior and experience of humans.
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Appendix A: Items from the Rating
Study in Experiment 1
(1) Der Text war mir zumindest sinngemäß bekannt. The text was familiar, even though
not necessarily literally. (Familiarity)
(2) Ich habe den Text verstanden I did understand the text. (Comprehension)
(3) Der Text hat mich zum Lachen/Schmunzeln gebracht. The text made me laugh/smile.
(Humor Behavioral)
(4) Der Text hat mich erheitert. The text amused me. (Humor Emotional)
(5) Der Text ist witzig. The text is funny. (Humor Cognitive)
(6) Der Text hat mich in die Irre geleitet. The text tricked me into the wrong way.
(Predictability Behavioral)
(7) Das Ende des Textes hat mich überrascht. The ending of the text did surprise me.
(Predictability Emotional)
(8) Das Ende des Textes ist vorhersehbar. The ending of the text is predictable. (Pre-
dictability Cognitive)
(9) Der Text ist verständlich. The text is understandable. (Comprehensibility Behav-
ioral)
(10) Der Text hat mich verwirrt. The text confused me. (Comprehensibility Emotional)
(12) Der Text ist Unsinn. The text is nonsense. (Comprehensibility Cognitive)
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Appendix B: Stimulus Material
Stimulus material was taken and adapted from internet collections (retrieved from
http://www.ahajokes.com/, http://www.jokedatabase.org, www.dein-witz.de, witze
-datenbank.de, www.witze-ohne-ende.de, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/
authors/s/steven_wright.html, in August, 2011), from various books and previous
articles on verbal humor (Attardo & Raskin, 1991; Coulson & Kutas, 1998, 2001; Coul-
son, 2001; Coulson & Lovett, 2004; Dynel, 2009; Hurley et al., 2011; Paulos, 2008;
Ritchie, 2001), from personal memory, and from friends.
• Mami, ich bin jetzt vierzehn Jahre alt, darf ich endlich einen BH und Make-up
tragen? Nein, und iss deine Suppe auf, mein . . .
Junge/Mädchen/Onkel!
(Primes in Experiment 5: Radiergummi/Barbie/Spielzeugauto)
• Der Polizist hält eine Autofahrerin an und ermahnt sie: Sie können doch nicht mit
80 durch das Ortsgebiet fahren. Darauf erwidert die Dame: 80! Ich muss wohl
mal wieder . . .
liften/bremsen/husten!
(Arbeit/Tachometer/Faltern)
• Ein Patient klingelt beim Haus seines Arztes. Die Frau des Arztes ö↵net die Tür.
Mit kranker Stimme flüstert der Patient: Ist der Arzt da? Die Frau flüstert zurück:
Nein, kommen Sie . . .
herein/morgen/daneben!
(Schuh/Stetoskop/Bettlaken)
• Eine Frau fragt die Verkäuferin im Kleiderladen. Dürfte ich das Kleid im Schaufen-




• Ein Freund zu seinem Freund, der gerade aus einer Wellness-Therme kommt: Hast
du ein Bad genommen? Darauf der andere: Nein, nur . . .
Handtücher/Massagen/Kaninchen.
(Salat/Wasser/Zubehör)
• Ich lasse meinen Steuerberater meine Buchhaltung durchführen. Das spart Zeit.
Letztes Jahr ersparte ich mir dadurch zehn . . .
Jahre/Tage/Schuhe.
(Bleistift/Freizeit/Handschellen)
• Ein Mann zum Barkeeper: Können Sie mir etwas empfehlen, das kalt ist und voller
Rum? Der Barkeeper antwortet: Ja, ich empfehle Ihnen meine . . .
Frau/Drinks/Musik.
(Verschwendung/Vorschlag/Ehekrise)
• Eine neue Studie untersuchte die Schlafgewohnheiten von Studenten. Der durch-
schnittliche Student steht um halb 8 Uhr in der Früh auf. Dann geht er . . .
schlafen/lernen/werfen.
(Versuch/Morgensonne/Party)
• Eine neue Studie besagt, dass in Deutschland pro Jahr 720 Millionen Euro für
Glücksspiel ausgegeben werden. Gut fünfzig Prozent davon entfallen auf . . .
Heiraten/Pokern/Forschen.
(Stuhl/Brautkleid/Roulette)
• Meine Freundin hat soviel Negatives über Rauchen gelesen. Deshalb hat sie
beschlossen, aufzuhören, mit dem . . .
Lesen/Rauchen/Reden.
(Reue/Gesundheit/Ignoranz)
• Ein Bauer erzählt einem anderen Bauern: Gestern hab ich den Hof und die Ernte
gegen Feuer und Hagel versichert. Darauf der andere Bauer: Gegen Feuer, das
finde ich gut. Aber Hagel kann man nicht . . .
erzeugen/versichern/bedienen.
(Verstand/Unwetter/Betrug)
• Ich wurde aus dem Kino geworfen, weil ich mein eigenes Essen mitbrachte. Aber
die Preise für die Snacks im Kino sind so unverschämt teuer. Außerdem hatte ich




• Immer wenn ich sie lachen sehe, Fräulein Susi, möchte ich zu ihnen sagen: Bitte
kommen Sie doch mal zu mir. Na, na, Sie sind mir vielleicht ein Casanova! Nein,
ich bin ein . . .
Zahnarzt/Liebhaber/Schriftsteller.
(Aufruhr/Flirt/Hygiene)
• Der Klassenlehrer zur stolzen Mutter: Ihr Sohn ist außerordentlich kreativ und
voller origineller Ideen. Vor allem im . . .
Rechtschreiben/Musizieren/Produzieren.
(Idee/Intelligenz/Nachhilfe)
• Die Frau zieht ihren Mann in das Schlafzimmer und sagt zu ihm: So, bitte zieh
meine Bluse, meinen BH und meine Unterhose aus. Ich will nicht, dass du meine
Sachen . . .
anprobierst/zerreißt/verkaufst.
(Vergesslichkeit/Leidenschaft/Travestie)
• Ein Freund beschwert sich bei einem anderen: Meine Freundin meint, ich bin viel
zu neugierig. Zumindest schreibt sie das in ihrem . . .
Tagebuch/Reisebericht/Scheckbuch.
(Vorsicht/Verleumdung/Schnü↵elei)
• Eine Frau sagt zu ihrer Freundin: Mein Mann ist ein Engel. Die andere antwortet:
Da hast du aber mehr Glück als ich, weil meiner noch . . .
lebt/trinkt/schläft.
(Intelligenz/Charme/Himmel)
• Der Arzt sagt zum Patienten: Ich kann die Ursache ihrer Beschwerden nicht
entdecken. Ehrlich gesagt, glaube ich, das kommt vom Trinken. Der Patient
antwortet: Gut, ich komme in einer Woche wieder. Vielleicht sind Sie dann . . .
nüchtern/schlauer/verwaist.
(Sieg/Diagnose/Inkompetenz)
• Sag mal Susi. Warum fütterst du deinen Kater mit Sonnenblumenkernen? Susi




• Eine Kuh sagt zur anderen: Fürchtest du dich eigentlich vor dem Rinderwahn?
Die andere Kuh antwortet: Warum sollte ich? Ich bin doch ein . . .
Flugzeug/Hausrind/Enkelkind !
(Ungenau/gesund/verrückt)
• Der Schwimmer fragt den Lifeguard: Und sie sind auch sicher, dass hier keine
Haigefahr herrscht? Der Lifeguard beruhigt den Schwimmer: Ja, ganz sicher. Die
vertragen sich nicht mit den . . .
Krokodilen/Algenarten/Ergebnissen.
(Verärgert/gefährlich/harmlos)
• Der Ehemann zu seiner Frau: Schatz. Ich habe einen tollen Job gefunden. Die
Frau findet das wunderbar. Darauf sagt der Mann: Toll, morgen ist der erste Tag
für . . .
dich/mich/ihn.
(Niederlage/Anstellung/Bevormundung)
• Was ist denn mit dir los? fragt der Wirt den unglücklichen Stammgast. Ach,
meine Frau ist mit meinem besten Freund durchgebrannt. Alles ist so sinnlos
ohne . . .
Freund/Frau/Ball.
(Radio/Liebe/Fußball)
• Ich würde gerne so wie mein Großvater sanft und ruhig im Schlaf sterben. Nicht
angsterfüllt und schreiend wie seine . . .
Fahrgäste/Kameraden/Vertreter.
(Notizbuch/Bett/Straßenverkehr)
• Ein Blinder kommt mit seinem Hund an der Leine in eine Bar. Plötzlich schwingt
er den Hund über seinem Kopf mit der Leine im Kreis. Der Barkeeper schreit ihn
an: Was machen Sie da? Der Blinde antwortet: Ach, einfach nur . . .
herumschauen/herumschwingen/herumschwimmen.
(Heizung/Quälerei/Sehhilfe)
• Die alte Hebamme kommt völlig aufgelöst zum Pfarrer: Mein Mann ist gestern
verstorben. Der Pfarrer versucht sie zu trösten: Das ist ja furchtbar. Hatte er
noch einen letzten Wunsch? Sie antwortet: Ja, seine letzten Worte waren: Bitte
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nicht . . .
schießen/weinen/hören!
(Zahnpasta/Witwe/Pistole)
• Der Sohn eines Rechtsanwalts fragt seinen Vater: Sagt ein Rechtsanwalt jemals
die Wahrheit? Der Vater antwortet: Ja, ein Rechtsanwalt macht alles, was hilft,
um einen Fall zu . . .
gewinnen/klären/teilen.
(einfühlsam/ehrlich/ehrgeizig)
• Ein Rechtsanwalt verteidigt den Angeklagten, der seine beiden Eltern ermordete:




• Ein Arzt hatte Sex mit einem seiner Patienten. Er beichtet es einem Freund und
rechtfertigt sich bei ihm: Ich bin sicher, dass machen viele andere Ärzte auch. Der
Freund antwortet: Ja, aber ich denke, von denen bist du der einzige . . .
Tierarzt/Frauenarzt/Malermeister.
(Frosch/Mensch/Pferd)
• Sie hat ihr gutes Aussehen von ihrer Mutter. Die Mutter ist . . .
Schönheitschirurgin/Unterwäschenmodel/Drogenkommissarin.
(Kiste/Gene/Skalpell)
• Ich leide nicht mehr unter Geisteskrankheit. Jeden einzelnen Augenblick meines
Lebens kann ich die Krankheit . . .
genießen/kontrollieren/vorbereiten.
(intelligent/gesund/verrückt)
• Ich habe zwei Warnschüsse abgefeuert. Beide in den . . .
Kopf/Himmel/Ofen.
(Lö↵el/Angst/Blut)
• Letztens habe ich mitansehen müssen, wie sechs Männer meinen Chef verprügel-
ten. Ich fühlte mich schlecht, weil ich nicht geholfen habe. Aber sechs Männer




• Ich habe noch immer den Körper einer 18-Jährigen. In meinem . . .
Keller/Alter/Bild.
(Auto/Diät/Kerker)
• Dreißig Jahre lang waren meine Frau und ich glücklich und zufrieden. Dann haben
wir uns . . .
getro↵en/getrennt/beliefert.
(Aufregung/Eheglück/Ehefrust)
• Über vierzig Jahre lang habe ich nun nur eine Frau geliebt. Ich ho↵e, dass meine
Frau das nie . . .
erfährt/vergisst/mietet.
(Wertschätzung/Zufriedenheit/Ehebetrug)
• Ich bin so stolz. Viermal die Woche gehe ich ins Fitness-Center. Bald mache ich
dort auch einen . . .
Work-Out/Yoga-Kurs/Surf-Kurs.
(Pullover/Liegestütze/Bierbauch)
• Ich hasse es, wenn Leute Freddie Mercury mit Gott vergleichen. Ich meine, er ist
gut. Aber doch nicht so gut wie der . . .
Rockstar/Allmächtige/Zirkusdirektor.
(Seife/Mikrophon/Himmel)
• Die OP-Assistentin warnt den Chirurgen: Doktor, schneiden Sie nicht zu tief. Sie
beschädigen sonst den . . .
OP-Tisch/Herzmuskel/Autolack.
(Linie/Stirnrunzeln/Kratzer)
• In New York wird alle zwei Minuten eine Person von einem Auto überfahren. Das
ist eine große gesundheitliche Gefahr für die . . .
Person/Einwohner/Polizei.
(Einverständnis/Statistik/Pechvogel)
• Ich habe den Wien-Marathon in unter drei Stunden beendet. Ich wäre eigentlich




• Ich bin kürzlich auf einem Pferd geritten. Der hintere Fuß des Pferdes war so
stark beeinträchtigt, dass ich es leider erschießen musste. Alle waren total darüber
entsetzt, also alle anderen in dem . . .
Kinderkarussel/Reitverein/Turnverein.
(Träumerei/Euthanasie/Verrücktheit)
• Um vier Uhr in der Früh ging heute der Autoalarm von meinem Nachbarn los.
Ich bin so furchtbar erschrocken, dass ich sofort . . .
weglief/aufwachte/aufaß.
(Türschild/Schlafzimmer/Brechstange)
• Glaub mir! Dir wehzutun, ist das Allerletzte, was ich vorhabe. Aber es ist . . .
eingeplant/unvermeidbar/unberührbar.
(introvertiert/lieb/gemein)
• Einmal pro Woche gehen meine Frau und ich in ein schickes Restaurant, danach
schauen wir einen romantischen Film im Kino, und danach haben wir leiden-
schaftlichen Sex. Manchmal machen wir das auch . . .
miteinander/mehrmals/minütlich. (Flucht/Kerzenschein/A↵äre)
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Appendix C: Data Base and
Intercorrelations of Stimulus
Variables
The empirical data of this dissertation projects contains data from: ratings (see Ex-
periment 1) (N = 68), Cloze-probability task (N = 65, Joke, Coherent), self paced
reading times (see Experiment 1) (N = 24, all three conditions), self paced reading
times (N = 45, only jokes), 2 ERP studies (Ns = 21, 24, N400, LLAN, LPs), Pupil
dilation (N = 21)
Variables of the data base that were included for the intercorrelations were:
Predictability Sum of the predictability rating of a joke in Experiment 1.
Comprehensibility Sum of the comprehensibility rating of a joke in Experiment 1.
Humor Potential Sum of the humor potential rating of a joke in Experiment 1.
LZ Reading time of the punch-line (final word) of a joke aggregated over participants
in Experiment 1.
lz2pl Reading time of the punch-line (final word) of a joke aggregated over participants
in Experiment 5.
lz2fs Average reading time of the follow-up sentence of a joke aggregated over partici-
pants in Experiment 5.
clozeJ The Cloze-probability of the joke ending of a joke.
clozeC The Cloze-probability of the coherent ending of a joke.
Pupil The pupil dilation between 800 and 2000 ms after the onset of the punch-line of
a joke aggregated over participants in Experiment 2.
N400 The mean amplitude of the N400-ROI between 250 and 500 ms after the onset
of the punch-line of a joke aggregated over participants in Experiment 2 and
Experiment 4.
LLAN The mean amplitude of the LLAN-ROI between 500 and 700 ms after the onset
of the punch-line of a joke aggregated over participants in Experiment 2 and
Experiment 4.
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Table 5.1: The most highly correlated variables of the data base. Correlations are based
on the Spearman-method.
First Variable Second Variable Correlation
Comprehensibility Predictability .51
Humor Potential Comprehensibility .5













LP The mean amplitude of the fP600-ROI between 700 and 1000 ms after the onset
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